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THE RIGHTS OF A WITNESS BEFORE A GRAND JURY
The implications of recent decisions of the Supreme Court which
have given new and expanded meanings to the procedural safe-
guards owing to a criminal defendant have not yet been fully
realized. Most immediately, they will undoubtedly affect estab-
lished practices of law enforcement agencies. An important con-
sequence of these changes, however, may also be the extension
of the right to counsel to the grand jury witness.
RECENT decisions of the Supreme Court fortifying and expanding
the constitutional fights of criminal defendants have thrown much
doubt upon the validity of existing governmental practices designed
to execute the criminal law. While the scope and impact of de-
cisions interpreting the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments are not
entirely clear, an analysis of the operations of the grand jury would
indicate that witnesses before that body may well benefit from de-
velopments in analogous areas of the law. It is, therefore, the pur-
pose of this comment to outline the established rights of witnesses
who are summoned before state and federal grand juries and to
examine the factors promoting an expansion of those existing rights
in light of the characteristics and policy foundations of grand jury
procedure.
BACKGROUND
A. Status of the Institution
As a preliminary step to a consideration of the rights of grand
jury witnesses, it is important to summarize the present status, the
purpose, and the peculiar characteristics of the grand jury in relation
to the entire criminal process. The fifth amendment to the Consti-
tution has been interpreted to provide that the criminally accused in
a federal prosecution has the right to an indictment or presentmen
"While the independent grand jury through its power of presentment is still con-
sidered by some proponents as a valuable potential restraint on corruption, e.g.,
YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1634-1941, at
245 (1963), the presentment device has become largely anachronistic. The Advisory
Committee has explained the absence of any mention of presentment in the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure by noting that "presentment is not included as an addi-
tional type of formal accusation, since presentments as a method of instituting prosecu-
tions are obsolete, at least as concerns the Federal courts." Advisory Commitee's Note,
18 U.S.C. Ap,. at 3746 (1964).
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by a grand jury if a conviction of the crime with which he is charged
could result in an "infamous" punishment. 2 The guarantee of the
grand jury, however, is personal to the accused and, like other consti-
tutional guarantees, may be waived.3
In contrast to the federal government, the states are not required
by the Constitution to initiate criminal prosecutions with a grand
jury proceeding.4 In Hurtado v. California,5 the petitioner, con-
victed of a capital offense in a state court, argued that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment compelled the states to proceed
by indictment or presentment in the prosecution of infamous
crimes.6 The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and, in doing
so, rejected the due process argument. The Court held that the
fourteenth amendment did not preclude experimentation by im-
2 The "infamous" punishment conception has been developed in a long line of
Supreme Court decisions construing the fifth amendment. It has been held that con-
finement at hard labor, United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922); or in a peni-
tentiary, Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1886); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417,
429 (1885); or punishment for more than one year, Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592
(5th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947), are infamous punishments.
The Federal Rules have codified these holdings in the following provision: "An offense
which may be punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense which
may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor shall
be prosecuted by indictment, or if indictment is waived, it may be prosecuted by in.
formation. Any other offense may be prosecuted by indictment or information." FED.
R. C m. P. 7 (a).
However, because "infamous punishment" is a functional concept, the criteria for
which may change according to "public opinion from one age to another," Ex parte
Wilson, supra at 127, the scope of the grand jury guarantee is always subject to en-
largement. See generally Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 359-60
(1959); Annot., 2 L. Ed. 2d 1960 (1958).
8Barkman v. Sanford, 162 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816
(1947). F. R. Ciur. P. 7(b) permits waiver of indictment except where the im-
position of capital punishment could result from conviction. In the interests of avoid-
ing the delay encountered in awaiting indictment, most defendants consent to accusa-
tion by information. See Bartlett v. United States, 354 F.2d 745, 749-50 (8th Cir.
1966).
' Similarly, territories of the United States are not constitutionally required to use
the presentment or indictment. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903).
110 U.S. 516 (1884).
6 According to the Court, the defendant argued that "the phrase 'due process of the
law' is equivalent to 'law of the land,' as found in the 29th chapter of Magna
Charta; that by immemorial usage it has acquired a fixed, definite, and technical
meaning ...... Id. at 521. Consequently, "any proceeding otherwise authorized by
law, which is not thus sanctioned by usage, or which supersedes and displaces one
that is, cannot be regarded as due process of the law." Id. at 528. To this rather
sweeping contention the Court replied: "But to hold that such a characteristic is
essential to due process of law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age,
and to render it incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon
our jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and
Persians." Id. at 529.
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posing immutable requirements of federal criminal procedure on
the states. Moreover, in reasoning that would today appear un-
sound, it indicated that due process could not encompass rights which
were conjunctively guaranteed by the fifth amendment.7 On the
basis of the sanction afforded by Hurtado, some states have replaced
the grand jury indictment or presentment with accusation by in-
formation for at least some prosecutions, while other jurisdictions
have found the historic institution well suited to modern exigencies
and consequently have retained it."
B. Purposes of the Grand Juiy
The grand jury has served two significant but potentially incon-
sistent purposes in the criminal proceeding.9 It has functioned both
as a body of accusers and as a protector of the citizen from unfounded
accusations.' 0 At its inception, the grand jury found its primary
raison d'etre in fulfilling its role as accuser." Later, however, with
5 The Court reasoned that the inclusion of the due process guarantee in the fifth
amendment in conjunction with the rights of self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and
grand jury action rendered these rights mutually exclusive. To the Court, therefore,
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment could not logically impose the
mandatory recognition of the rights of self-incrimination, double jeopardy, or grand
jury action on the states. 110 U.S. at 534. Implicit in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964) (incorporating the privilege against self-incrimination into the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause) is a necessary rejection of this reasoning. See id.
at 20-22 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
In addition to relying on a presently discarded constitutional construction, the
Court in Hurtado was true to the nineteenth century evolutionary Weltanschauung in
its appraisal of the underlying public policy to be promoted. The policy argument
in question was succinctly articulated by the Wisconsin Supreme Court some years
before the Hurtado decision: "Administration and remedial proceedings must change
from time to time with the advancement of legal science and the progress of so-
ciety .... " Rowan v. State, 30 Wis. 129, 149 (1872).
It would appear to follow that the Hurtado reasoning to the effect that due
process does not refer to certain specific procedural aspects of a criminal prosecution
can no longer be accepted. Therefore, the question of the states' obligation to adopt
the grand jury as a requirement of due process is subject to reevaluation in the light
of contemporary standards. See Malloy v. Hogan, supra at 4 n.2, 5. But see State v.
Kanistanaux, 414 P.2d 784 (Wash. 1966).
8 See Scigliano, The Grand Jury, the Information, and the Judicial Inquiry, 38 ORE.
L. REv. 803, 305 (1959); Spain, The Grand Jury, Past and Present: A Suruey, 2 Amsau-
CAN Camn. L.Q. 119, 126-42 (1964).
SORsEtLD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE fROM AlRuEsT TO APPEAL 144-46 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as ORFIELD]; Orfield, supra note 2, at 394.
10See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 556 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting). A
possible third purpose of the grand jury was to inject further technicalities into the
criminal law as an early revolt from the severity of its consequences.
II See id. at 530; EDwARDs, THE GRAND JURY 21-25 (1906) [hereinafter cited as ED-
wARDs]; OprELD 138-39.
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the development of the petit jury and the adoption of the accusa-
torial criminal trial,1 2 the grand jury's most important function
became the task of standing "steadfast between the crown and the
people in the defense of the liberty of the citizen."'1  Even today
the accusatorial function dearly predominates when the grand jury
acts on its own initiative by proffering presentments.' 4 However,
where the government initiates the inquisition by drawing an indict-
ment on which the grand jury is directed to act, the accusatorial role
is dearly subordinate to the protective one.'5
Considered in the light of its history in American law, the more
important of the grand jury's two roles would appear to be its pro-
tective function. In addition to the fact that, at the time the in-
stitution was enshrined in the Constitution, English law stressed the
protective feature, 6 the placement of the grand jury guarantee in our
2
2 See EnwAmts 26-28; Oarmnu 139.
18 EDWARDS 27.
1
,Since the presentment originates with the grand jury and is a result of its
independent probing, it is evident that in this instance, the positive, accusatorial
aspect is predominant. Note in this regard, however, that the Advisory Committee
for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure considers the presentment obsolete. See
note 1 supra. See also McNair's Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 Ad. 498 (1936) (recognizing
that the power of presentment does not obtain in Pennsylvania); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-137 (1953) (abolishing the presentment).
I"Where the prosecutor brings an indictment the grand jury screens his case to
protect the accused from facing trial where the evidence is insufficient to make out a
prima fade case.
Acceptance of the position that the central purpose of the grand jury is protective
has prompted the conclusion that the test for sufficiency of evidence for an indictment
should be based on "susceptibility to conviction," that is, "if nothing more were
heard at trial, a petit jury could conclude that the prosecution had successfully borne
the burden of proof." Note, 72 YALE L.J. 590, 592 (1963). State statutes setting forth
the proof requisite for returning a true bill most frequently express the test in terms
similar to ARK. STAT. ANN. §43-920 (1947): "The grand jury should find an indict-
ment when all the evidence before them, taken together, would, in their judgment,
if unexplained, warrant a conviction by the trial jury." E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.8;
IowA CODE § 771.16 (1962); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-6320 (1947). But see Aiuz.
R. QuM. P. 103; KY. R. CalM. P. 5.10. But cf. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359
(1956), where the Court indicated that an indictment based entirely on hearsay testi-
mony would not be set aside.
18 Blackstone indicates the significance of the grand jury in the following passage:
"But to find a bill, there must at least twelve of the jury agree: for so tender is the
law of England of the lives of the subjects, that no man can be convicted at the suit
of the king of any capital offense, unless by the unanimous voice of twenty-four of
his equals and neighbors; that is, by twelve at least of the grand jury, in the first
place, assenting to the accusation; and afterwards, by the whole petit jury, of twelve
more, finding him guilty, upon his trial." 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARMS 0301. "But
these informations (of every kind) are confined by the constitutional law to mere mis-
demeanors only: for, wherever any capital offense is charged, the same law requires
that the accusation be warranted by the oath of twelve men, before the party should
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Bill of Rights as a restraint upon governmental prerogative-accom-
panied by the guarantees against self-incrimination, double jeopardy
and deprivation of due process-convincingly indicates the dominant
character of the protective role.17
C. Characteristics of the Proceeding
Certain peculiar characteristics of the grand jury proceeding
dictate, in part, the scope and the nature of the witness' rights. In
the first instance, grand jury proceedings are ex parte 8 and, absent
special statutory provisions to the contrary, the accused has neither
the right to appear as a witness 9 nor to compel the body to hear his
witnesses. 20 Yet, if the grand jury desires, it may compel persons,
including the accused, to appear as witnesses under subpoena.21
be put to answer it." Id. at 0305. See also 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 294
(8th ed. Curwood 1824) where the author observes that dispensing with the grand
jury would be "contrary not only to the common law, but to MACNA CHARTA, and other
statutes made in affirmance of it."
27 See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 545-58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962) (Warren, C. J.): "Historically, [the
grand jury] ... has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function in our society
of standing between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine whether a charge
is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or by malice and
personal ill will." But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F. Supp. 283, 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1933): "The inquisitorial power of the grand jury is the most valuable function
which it possesses to-day and, far more than any supposed protection which it gives to
the accused, justifies its survival as an institution." A particular court's view of the
primary function of the grand jury might even affect the outcome of a case. Compare
United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959), with
United States v. Cleary, 164 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (same case below).
18 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 65 (1906); State v. Stallings, 25 Conn. Supp. 386,
206 A.2d 277 (Super. Ct. 1964). "The investigation made by the grand jury is an ex
parte inquiry, in which only the evidence for the prosecution is heard." ORPIELD 162.
29 United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604, 605 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 790 (1944). Exemplifying a modification of this rule, New York has
provided that, "when any person has reason to believe that a grand jury is investigat-
ing a charge that he has committed a crime" he may petition for an appearance
which may be granted in the grand jury's discretion if the person signs a waiver of
immunity. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRoc. § 250. See also OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 335
(Supp. 1964).
20 Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 Dall. 236 (Pa. 1788). Under special circumstances, ihe
normal functioning of a grand jury may be altered by statute with the result that
additional protections are extended to the accused. Thus, in Georgia, it is provided
by statute that one accused of malfeasance in office shall have the right to stage a
preliminary defense before the grand jury with the derivative rights to the assistance
of counsel and to call witnesses. GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1617 (1935). See Clinkscales v.
State, 102 Ga. App. 670, 117 SXE.2d 229 (1960); Cadle v. State, 101 Ga. App. 175, 113
S.E.2d 180 (1960).
21 See text accompanying notes 31-32 infra. Statutes often direct, or at least make
provision for, the grand jury to hear evidence for an accused where such information
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Furthermore, the grand jury has great latitude with respect to the
matters it may probe.22  So long as the body does not infringe upon a
witness' rights or privileges, it is not restricted in its receipt of evi-
dence or course of inquiry by the rules which govern a criminal
trial.23
would tend to exculpate him. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.7; IOWA CODE § 771.15 (1962);
LA. R v. STAT. § 15:214 (1950); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-6319 (1947). But see
Cowo. REV. STAT. ANN. 39-3-2 (1963) (grand jury shall hear only witnesses for the state).
22 "It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the
scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or
forecasts of the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any par-
ticular individual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime." In re
Black, 47 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir. 1931). "The sources of grand jury information are
almost unlimited." United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
See also Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1918). See generally Orfield, supra note
2, at 394-402.
The scope of state grand jury proceedings is often limited by the common juris.
dictional limitation that it shall investigate only alleged offenses triable within the
county where it is sitting. E.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 917; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.16 (1944);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1101 (1947); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-807 (1956). Another possible
limitation on the jurisdictional power may exist when a so-called special grand jury
is convened to investigate a particular matter. See S.D. CODE § 34.1203 (Supp. 1960).
23 Most of the matters protected from consideration by the grand jury are those
which a particular witness will be privileged from disclosing. The operation and scope
of these privileges will be separately considered later (see notes 99-107 infra and ac-
companying text); however, the proper scope of the grand jury investigation can be
important not only where the witness challenges a particular line of inquiry but also
where a defendant challenges the basis of a true bill. Where the challenge is to the
evidence constituting the basis of the accusation the courts have been quite reluctant
to circumscribe the grand jury's investigational scope by overturning indictments.
The reasons for this reluctance to supervise the body more closely include the follow-
ing:
(1) The grand jury proceeding is not an adversary action, and, although important
(see note 17 supra and accompanying text), it does not finally adjudicate rights or
obligations;
(2) The judge does not preside over the proceeding to minimize errors in their
incipiency; and
(3) Undue time and effort would be consumed by making the grand jury the situs
of a preliminary trial to determine whether there should be a full-fledged trial.
Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
Thus, in Costello v. United States, supra, the Court held that an indictment based
entirely on hearsay evidence would not be set aside. See note 15 supra and accompany-
ing text. See also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 839, 349-50 (1958) (no right to a
separate hearing to determine whether illegal evidence was used); United States v.
Block, 202 F. Supp. 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (refusal to set aside indictment where grand
jury heard illegally seized evidence on grounds that it might not have been the only
evidence). But see Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (requiring
that an indictment be supported by some other evidence than an unconstitutionally
obtained confession). See generally Silverstein, Federal Grand Jury Testimony and the
Fifth Amendment, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 215; Note, Ill U. PA. I. REv. 1154 (1963); Note,
72 YA. E L.J. 590 (1963).
State statutory modifications in various forms would appear to alter the general
rule that the grand jury may hear incompetent evidence. The most restrictive type
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The most important feature of grand jury procedure as far as a
witness is concerned is the fact that the institution operates in
camera.2 4 Neither the judge of the court under which it is con-
vened nor the counsel of the witness may be present during the
proceedings.25  Generally, the only persons who are permitted in the
grand jury room are the grand jurors, the witness, a stenographer,
and the prosecuting attorney who directs the course of the investiga-
tion and acts as a legal advisor to the grand jury.28 To preserve the
of statute is exemplified by S.D. CODE § 34.1224 (Supp. 1960): "The grand jury can
receive none but legal evidence and the best evidence in degree, to the exclusion of
hearsay or secondary evidence." Accord, CAL. PEN. CODE § 939.6; IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 19-1105 (1947); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.59 (1945); MONT. REv. CoDEs ANN. 94-6318
(1947); NEv. REv. STAT. § 172.260 (1963); N.Y. CoDz Cum. PROC. §§ 249-50; N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 29-10-23 to -24 (1960); O. REv. STAT. § 132.320 (1963). Other statutes would
apparently exclude some, but not all, incompetent evidence. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30,
§ 86 (1958); ARx. STAT. ANN. §43-918 (1947); IOwA CODE § 771.17 (1962); LA. REv.
STAT. § 15:213 (1950); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 333 (Supp. 1964). See generally Note,
1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 102, 111-15.
" The "indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings" is often acclaimed by the
courts. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); Pittsburgh
Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 399-400 (1959). The purposes of grand
jury secrecy were summarized in United-States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir.
1954) as follows: "(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be con-
templated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and
to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand
jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before [the] grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
(4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect [an] innocent accused who is
exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from
the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt." An additional
purpose for grand jury secrecy which was candidly admitted in United States v.
Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 289 (N.D. Cal. 1952), is to aid .the prosecutors and permit
them to influence the grand jury.
While the bulk of the cases dealing with grand jury secrecy arise where there is
an attempt to discover the contents of the proceedings for purposes related to use
thereof at a subsequent trial, see Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966), the
tenacity of the secrecy requirement may directly affect the latitude of the rights afforded
to a witness. See note 120 infra and acnompanying text.
25See text accompanying notes 108-18 infra. It may be possible for the judge
to appear briefly for the purpose of giving advice or elaborating upon his charge, but
thereafter the grand jury generally performs its investigative function without the
judge's presence. See e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-932-(1947); CAL. PEN. CODE § 935;
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-6324 (1947). The judge's assumption of control over the
grand jury is thereby prevented. See O'Bryan v. Chandler, 249 F. Supp. 51, 55 (W.D.'
Okla. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1965).
26 See, e.g., FEn. R. Cman. P. 6; ARiz. R. CiuM. P. 98; ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-6
(Supp. 1965). See also United States v. Edgerton, 80 Fed. 374, 375 (D. Mont. 1897),
where an indictment was quashed because an expert witness was allowed to remain
in the grand jury room during the testimony of another witness.
However, North Carolina does not allow the prosecuting attorney to be present in
the grand jury room. See Lewis v. Commissioners, 74 N.C. 169, 173 (1876). Some
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secrecy of the inquisition the grand jurors take an oath not to disclose
any details concerning the proceedings.27
TiH WrrN~ss' PRE-TEsTFiCATION RIGHTS: LIMITATIONS
ON THE SUBPOENA POWER
A. Subpoena ad testificatum
The witness' initial encounter With the grand jury usually in-
volves the receipt of a subpoena ad testificatum. Unless the sub-
poena itself is invalid for failure to comply with the statutory pre-
requisites,28 the recipient must respond by appearing pursuant to
the order of the court issuing it." Failing to do so without good
states, in lieu of or in addition to a stenographer, also provide that one of the grand
jurors be appointed "clerk" with the iresponsibility of transcribing minutes of the pro-
ceedings. E.g., Amiz. R. Cuam. P. 94; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-905 (1947).
27 A typical oath for the grand jurors is found in OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2939.06
(Page 1953): "You and each of you do solemnly swear that you will diligently inquire,
and true presentment make of all such matters and things as shall be given you in
charge or otherwise come to your knowledge ... ; the counsel of the state, your own,
and your fellows, you shall keep secret unless called on in a court of justice to make
disclosures ... ." Accord, IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-807 (1956); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch.
203, § 1252 (1964).
There are, in reality, three separate aspects to the secrecy requirement which shrouds
the grand jury. The first is to keep secret the identity of the person being investigated
until that person is in the custody of the police or free on recognizance. E.g., ALA.
CODE tit. 30, § 95 (1958); IowA CODE § 771.23 (1962). The second aspect involves the
generally absolute command that the grand jurors may not disclose the content ol
grand jury deliberations or votes to which only the jurors themselves were privy.
E.g., ARuz. R. CQuM. P. 106; GA. CODE ANN. § 59-303 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1113
(1947). The final element of the secrecy oath imposes a qualified silence on the jurors
not to divulge the testimony of witnesses who appeared before them. E.g., Aiz. R
QUM. P. 107; CAL. PEN. CODE § 924.2; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1112 (1947).
A violation of this oath by a grand juror may result in a conviction for contempt
of court, see, e.g., In re Atwell, 140 Fed. 368 (W.D.N.C. 1905), or other statutor)
penalty, see, e.g., ARu. STAT. ANN. § 43-929 (1964); CAL. PEN. CODE § 924.1. While it hat
been held that the courts also have an inherent discretionary power to impose tht
secrecy requirement on grand jury witnesses, Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 511
(9th Cir. 1939), statutes in some jurisdictions have pre-empted the area and deniec
such power. See Advisory Committee's Note, 18 U.S.C. AP.. at 140 (1964); DEL. SUPER
CT. ( RIM.) R. 6. But see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 905.27 (Supp. 1965); HAWAII REV. LAWI
§ 279-1 (1955); TIx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 388 (1954). It is common to require secreo
from stenographers and any necessary interpreters. E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 4:
(1957); Mo. REv. STAT. § 540.105 (1949); UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IH
(1952).
28 See generally 8 WxGMoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2199-2200 (1961 ed.) [hereinafter cited a
WIGMORE], where the author canvasses the necessary elements of a valid subpoena.
29 See 8 WioMo, §§ 2204-07, where the circumstances under which an excusabli
inability to attend in response to a subpoena are delineated.
While the court must generally issue subpoenas, some states allow other officials tt
issue them at the request of the grand jury. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 83 (1958)
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 609; TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 382 (1954).
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cause may constitute contempt of court30 Generally the recipient is
not privileged to refuse to respond merely because he is the object
of the investigation;"1 however, in some jurisdictions, either by rule
81 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 30, § 47 (1958); TEx. CODE CaM. Pnoc. art. 474 (1954).
"L Persons who deem themselves the object of a grand jury investigation have often
claimed the right not to appear or have challenged an indictment on the grounds that
they were called as a witness, asserting, in either case, that the privilege against self-
incrimination prohibited such compulsory appearance by analogy to a criminal trial.
The federal courts have generally refused to sustain such objections but have indicated
that there may be limits with respect to who may be called and under what circum-
stances the inquiry may proceed. In the early case of United States v. Edgerton, 80
Fed. 874 (D. Mont. 1897), the court, quashing indictments as procured in violation of
the privilege against self-incrimination, stated: "It is fatal to the indictments that the
defendant was called to testify in the particular matter from which they resulted,
without being informed or knowing that his own conduct was the subject under in-
vestigation." Id. at 375. (Emphasis added.)
The Edgerton requirement that the witness be informed that his own conduct is
being scrutinized was not alluded to in United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812 (ED.
Mo. 1948), where the court found no error in indictments returned against a witness
and allegedly supported by his own testimony; however, the court commented that
"such practice is not to be commended [because] . . . prosecuting officials should be
careful to protect the constitutional rights of all citizens." Id. at 816.
In United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. -1953), the court set aside an
indictment on constitutional grounds where the defendants testified before the grand
jury giving evidence which "furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed to con-
vict them for the crimes charged." Id. at 678. It did so, however, by confining itself
largely to the particular facts: "An indictment is invalid if a defendant against whom
a criminal information has been filed, is called by the prosecution as a witness before
the grand jury to obtain evidence tending to sustain an indictment against him which
supersedes the earlier information." Id. at 677. (Emphasis added.) Thus, the two
necessary elements for invalidity were (I) the pendency of a formal accusation and
(2) the attempt of the prosecutor to obtain incriminating information. See Note, 45
IowA L. Rxv. 564 (1960).
In United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. 111. 1954), the court rejected
defendant's motions to dismiss various indictments in language broadly restrictive of the
scope of the self-incrimination privilege. Defendant had argued that summoning a
prospective defendant constitutionally prohibited a subsequent indictment, while the
Government denied that the defendant was a prospective defendant when he was
called; however, the decision did not find such a distinction to be determinative. Thus,
the court concluded that "the protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment is to permit
a person to claim the privilege against self-incrimination if he wishes so to do but
the Amendment does not prevent his being called to testify where he makes his election
to testify or not to testify." Id. at 517. See United States v. Irwin, 854 F.2d 192, 199
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204,
207 (2d Cir.) (reviewing authorities), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965); United States
v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 836 (1957); United States v.
Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442, 461 (M.M. Pa. 1958); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 4 F.
Supp. 283 (ED. Pa. 1933). See also United States v. Rosen, 353 F.2d 523 (2d Cir.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); Carlson v. United States, 209 F.2d 209 (1st
Cir. 1954). The broad language of the Manno case expresses what appears to be the
majority rule in the federal courts.
In United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d ir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955),
the court refused to disturb a conviction by vacating indictments returned subsequent
to defendant's appearance before the grand jury. Error was urged in the grand jury's
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or practice, the grand jury is not permitted to subpoena those who
are actually being investigated.32
failure to warn the allegedly prospective defendant of his right not to incriminate him-
self. The court held that "until a formal charge is openly made against the accused"
no such warning was necessary. 225 F.2d at 114-15. To like effect, see United States
v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 920 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958). See note
61 infra and accompanying text.
In United States v. Grossman, 154 F. Supp. 813 (D.N.J. 1957), the court, after an
extensive review of the authorities, rejected defendant's claim that a person marked
for prosecution could not be called by i grand jury investigating him. The 'court
adhered to the general rule "apparently firmly established by all the recent Federal
decisions . . . that, even if the defendants were so marked, calling them before the
Grand Jury is not grounds for the quashing of the Indictment provided (1) no com-
plaint or indictment is then actually outstanding against them and (2) they are not
compelled to testify." Id. at 816.
The failure to warn a witness who was the object of the grand jury investigation
was considered to be the crucial fact in United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232
(N.D. Ill. 1963), where indictments returned subsequent to the testimony were set
aside. The court rejected the view that any labeling of the witness as "witness, possible
defendant, prospective defendant, putative defendant, named defendant" would be
determinative. Therefore, the test laid down by the court was much broader than
the rule in United States v. Scully, supra, and may be summarized as follows: "[N]o
individual who is not warned of his privilege against self-incrimination and executes a
formal immunity waiver either upon advice of counsel or after declining such advice,
may subsequently be indicted for an offense about which he was questioned before
the Grand Jury." 213 F. Supp. at 234. But see note 65 infra and accompanying
text. I I 17t
The waters have been further muddied by the recent case of Jones v. United States,
34 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964), where the court, in the exercise of its supervisory power
over the administration of justice, held that the prospective defendant should not be
taken before the grand jury without prior advice of counsel. However, five concurring
judges felt there was a serious question is to whether the Constitution permitted the
bringing of a "person against whom an indictment is being sought" before the grand
* jury. Id. at 867.
While it is clear from a review of the cases that the outermost limits to which a
federal grand jury may go in calling prospective defendants have not been definitively
established, it is likewise evident that no blanket immunity from non-appearance exists
for -the witness whose own conduct is or becomes the subject of the inquisition. Scv-
eral states also follow the federal practice of allowing the appearance of prospective
defendants: See, e.g., Burke v. State, 104 Ohio St. 220, 135 N.E. 644 (1922); Gendron
v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 82 A.2d 773 (1951) (where the practice is criticized but not
fatal to the indictments); TEx. CoDE Cumr. PROC. art. 389 (1954) (expressly recognizing
the grand jury's authority to question the accused).
82 For example, New York has consistently held that, in keeping with the privilege
against self-incrimination, "a person against whom the inquiry of the grand jury is
directed should not be required to attend before that body, much less be sworn by it,
and if he is and an indictment be found, it should be set aside upon motion and, if not,
if the fact appears upon the trial, it will invalidate a conviction if one be had." People
v. Gillette, 126 App. Div. 665, 670, 111 N.Y. Supp. 133, 136 (1908) (conviction for perjury
before grand jury reversed because oath invalid). See People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595,
127 N.E.2d 592 (1955) (reversing contempt conviction for failure of prospective de-
fendant to answer questions); People v. Werkes, 46 Misc. 2d 1020, 261 N.Y.S.2d 726
(Sup. Ct. 1965) (setting aside indictment where defendant was called); People v.
Seaman, 174 Misc. 792, 21 N.Y.S.2d 917 (Sup. Ct. 1940); People v. Bermel, 71 Misc. 356,
128 N.Y. Supp. 524 (Sup. Ct. 1911). Other states have reached the same conclusion
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B. Subpoena duces tecum
The subpoena duces tecum is a device frequently employed by
the grand jury to secure the production of books, records, or chattels
for inspection.3 3 The form and method of service of the subpoena
are prescribed by statute, compliance with which is essential to its
validity.3 4 Furthermore, in order to command acquiescence, the
subpoena must specify with "reasonable particularity" the objects
sought to be produced.35 Besides specificity of designation, the scope
of the subpoena is substantively limited by the constitutional mandate
that the order for production must be "reasonable."36 Reasonable-
ness is determined by considering the grand jury's proper and po-
tential use for the matter on the one hand and the witness' burdens
of production on the other.37 Thus, where production would involve
as DeFeo and Werkes concerning the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination as
it relates to the appearance of grand jury witnesses. E.g., People v. Calhoun, 50 Cal. 2d
137, 323 P.2d 427 (1958); State v. Jemison, 240 La. 787, 790-91, 125 So. 2d 363, 364
(1960). A person under investigation may appear in some circumstances at his own
request. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
33 See 4 BARRON g- HoLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE & PRocEDuRE § 2044 (Wright ed.
1961); 5 MOORE, FEDERAL PRAcrica § 45.05 (2d ed. 1964); 8 WIGamoR § 2200.
" See authority cited note 28 supra.
"5 See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 77 (1906); In re Eastman Kodak Co., 7
F.R.D. 760 (W.D.N.Y. 1947); United States v. Medical Soc., 26 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.
1938).
" The requirement that the subpoena must be "reasonable" is grounded in the
fourth amendment. Hale v. Henkel, supra note 35, at 76; Schwimmer v. United States,
232 F.2d 855, 860 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); In re Grand Jury In-
vestigation, 174 F. Supp. 393, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court,
15 Cal. 2d 206, 100 P.2d 302 (1940); Red Star Labs. Co. v. Pabst, 359 Ill. 451, 194 N.E.
734 (1935). This reasonableness criterion is also occasionally written into the statute
authorizing the use of the subpoena. E.g., FED. R. CRIr. P. 17 (c); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 491.100 (1949).
In the light of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (incorporating the privilege
against illegal searches and seizures into the fourteenth amendment), this requirement
of "reasonableness" would now appear to be universally mandatory.
87 Hale v. Henkel, supra note 35, at 77, where the Court gave as one of its reasons
for vacating the subpoena the fact that the burdens of compliance would threaten the
witness' ability to carry on his business. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 33 F.
Supp. 367, 372 (M.D.N.C. 1940); United States v. Medical Soc., 26 F. Supp. 55 (D.D.C.
1938). However, the size of the corporate recipient of the subpoena is a significant
factor in determining the weight of the burdens involved in compliance. Application
of Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D. 167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
In Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956), the court indicated the type of balancing involved in deciding the fourth
amendment question as follows: "In general terms, the test to be applied under [the
amendment] ... is whether the thing done or attempted to be done, in the sum of
its form, scope, nature, incidents and effect, impresses as being fundamentally unfair
or unreasonable in the specific situation, when the immediate end sought is considered
against the private right affected." 232 F.2d at 861.
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great expenditures of time, effort, or money and the grand jury's
need for the materials is negligible, the subpoena may be avoided.8
However, where it appears that production might advance the inves-
tigation and the only objection is based upon inconvenience to the
witness, the courts generally defer to the grand jury's request.39 Fur-
thermore, the reasonableness of the subpoena is not conclusively de-
termined by the possible inadmissibility of the material at a subse-
quent trial.40
Non-compliance with the instructions of the subpoena duces
tecum may also be justified where the grand jury is attempting to
recover articles which have been previously taken or discovered by
an illegal search and seizure and subsequently returned. Such mate-
rials might properly be excluded from governmental consideration
in any circumstance as "fruits of the poisonous tree. '41
88 There are numerous instances of situations where subpoenas have been quashed
because the documents requested were too numerous or covered too great a span of
time. Hale v. Henkel, supra note 35, at 77; Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855,
862-63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 933 (1956); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 174
F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 6 F.R.D. 347 (D. Mass.
1947); United States v. Medical Soc., supra note 37.
The courts may conclude that the need for the documents is slight where it appears
that the grand jury is embarked upon an "unlimited exploratory investigation ...
whose purposes and limits can be determined only as it proceeds ...." In re Grand
Jury Investigation, supra at 395. Thus, to a limited degree, the subpoenas of a runaway
grand jury, off on a "fishing expedition," may be somewhat more vulnerable to an
attack upon "reasonableness" grounds than those of juries whose mandate is more
circumscribed. See Schwimmer v. United States, supra note 37.
Although the separate factors which will make a subpoena duces tecum unreasonable
can be identified from the cases, the courts have not established definitive rules to assist
in the quest for determining reasonableness. The decisions proceed on an ad hoc
basis rendering precedent of "little value." Application of Radio Corp. of America,
supra note 37, at 171.
39 Only in "rare cases ... should [the court] exercise its power to deny process to
the Grand Jury." Id. at 172. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 32 F.R.D. 175
(S.D.N.Y. 1963); Petition of Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D. Ill. 1948).
40 Subpoenas are often attacked on the grounds that the material sought is "irrele-
vant." Although this objection may be a factor in determining "reasonableness," never-
theless to the extent that a finding for the recipient would circumscribe the grand
jury's inquisitorial power, the courts are reluctant to quash the subpoena. See Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Application of Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D. 167
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). But cf. Red Star Labs. Co. v. Pabst, 359 Ill. 451, 194 N.E. 734 (1935);
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1985.
,1 The leading case involving the use of illegally seized material is United States v.
Silverthorne, 265 Fed. 859 (W.).N.Y. 1920), where the court quashed an indictment
which was obtained on the basis of evidence secured in an illegal search and seizure.
See Note, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 1154, 1167-72 (1963). The Silverthorne litigation eventu-
ally reached the Supreme Court on a fresh indictment and there the Court set down
the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine which requires exclusion not only of evi-
dence obtained during an illegal search and seizure, but also of evidence suggested
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A related limitation on the subpoena duces tecum is the witness'
absolute privilege against surrendering under compulsion documents
which would be self-incriminatory. 42  While questions as to the scope
and manner of determining the privilege are the same as for testifica-
tion,43 unique problems arise where the information sought has been
reduced to tangible form. The difficulty stems from the nature of
the privilege, which is personal to the "holder" of the information
and thus cannot be claimed for another's benefit.44  For example, a
mere custodian of corporate or union papers cannot refuse to produce
such documents by invoking the self-incrimination privilege. 45 Two
limitations on the custodian rule, however, may be indicative of a
reluctance by the courts to narrowly circumscribe the scope of the
privilege. It has been held that while a custodian cannot refuse
to produce documents in his possession, he may refuse to testify
by and unearthed in consequence of such illegal search. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). In In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 858 (1947), the court also acted to prevent the grand jury from considering
constitutionally "illegal" evidence in the form of a coerced confession. The decision
in In re Fried, however, was based upon a view of the grand jury which has not
attained widespread acceptance. Judge Frank emphasized the adverse effects of a true
bill on the accused as a reason for demanding stringent control over the evidence
the grand jury is allowed to consider: "For a wrongful indictment is no laughing
matter; often it works a grievous, irreparable injury to the person indicted. The
stigma cannot be easily erased. In the public mind, the blot on a man's escutcheon,
resulting from such a public accusation of wrongdoing, is seldom wiped out by a
subsequent judgment of not guilty. Frequently the public remembers the accusation,
and still suspects guilt, even after acquittal." 161 F.2d at 458-59. But cf. Costello v.
United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
FED. R. Cmdr. P. 41(e) permits a person "aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure" to recover the property and suppress its use as evidence before trial. How-
ever, the extent to which the states are constitutionally required by the fourteenth
amendment to suppress the use of illegal evidence in the preliminary stages of a
prosecution, including the grand jury proceeding, is not yet certain.
,2 The application of the testimonial privilege against self-incrimination to the
protection of communicative documents is constitutionally guaranteed by joint opera-
tion of the fourth and fifth amendments-compelled production of incriminating docu-
ments being per se unreasonable. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
Similarly, where a person has given a privileged document to his lawyer in the
course of an attorney-client relationship, the lawyer cannot be compelled to produce
it by reason of the combined effect of the attorney-client and self-incrimination
privileges. United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963). See 8 WIGMORE
§ 2307.
," See text accompanying notes 68, 74-78, 80-85 infra.
"See 8 WIGMORE § 2270. But see note 41 supra.
"5 Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957) (dictum); United States v. White,
322 U.S. 964 (1944) (labor official may not claim privilege for union books to protect
himself); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911) (agent of corporation cannot refuse
to produce corporate records to protect himself); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906)
(agent of corporation cannot assert privilege to protect corporation).
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about them or to reveal their whereabouts if by so doing he would
incriminate himself.46 Furthermore, a partner in possession of part-
nership papers may claim the privilege at least where the partnership
is of the small family type.47
In addition to the protections afforded by the complementary
operation of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the recipient of the sub-
poena is also protected from disclosing or having disclosed against
him material which is shielded from governmental consideration by
an applicable statutory privilege. The scope of these privileges is
the same as for testification and the problems of their operation are
discussed later.48
Where the recipient wishes to challenge the subpoena duces
tecum for any of the aforementioned reasons, the appropriate method
is a motion to quash directed to-the court which originally issued the
process.49  In the federal courts, denial of the motion to quash the
subpoena is not a "final order" and hence is not appealable, 0 but a
wrongful refusal to produce the subpoenaed material may create
the danger of a contempt conviction from which an appeal will lie."'
However, since the witness who receives a subpoena duces tecum will
ordinarily have time to consult counsel, thereby minimizing the
likelihood of a wrongful refusal to comply, his position is less pre-
16 Curcio v. United States, 345 U.S. 118 (1957). See also United States v. Guterma,
272 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1959), where the court invalidated a subpoena insofar as it
would have compelled appellant to reveal a safe combination and thereby make
available certain corporate books incriminating himself.
"'In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1948).
8 8 For a discussion of the various relevant common law and statutory privileges, see
notes 102-07 infra and accompanying text.
"I FE. R. CRIM. P. 17 (c). Under state procedure a variety of means may be avail-
able to attack the issuance of a subpoena. These include a writ of prohibition, see
Southern Pac. Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 2d 206, 100 P.2d 302 (1940); and a motion
to quash or vacate, see Pelton Motors, Inc. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. App. 2d 565,
261 P.2d 275 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
In order to have the subpoena quashed, the recipient may be required to produce
the requested documents so that the court may pass on asserted grounds for objections.
Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855, 864 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
50 Cobbledick v, United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); Dugan & McNamara, Inc. v.
Clark, 170 F.2d 118 (3d Cir. 1948); Orfield, supra note 2, at 388. But see Perlman v.
United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1917); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 866 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). Review, of course, is permitted after a final judg-
ment where the subpoena has required an illegal search and seizure and a lower
court order is therefore tainted.
51 E.g., Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928). See FED. R. Cux. P. 17 (g).
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carious than that of the testifying witness who must fend entirely for
himself during testification.
TEsTIFICATION
A. Privilege against self-incrimination
The privilege of the fifth amendment against compulsory self-
incrimination has long been applied to federal grand jury proceed-
ings, 2 and its recent extension to state proceedings through the
fourteenth amendment assures its universal applicability.53 In the
light of the wide range of matters into which the grand jury may per-
missibly delve,54 the testimonial privilege against self-incrimination
is clearly the bulwark right of the witness. The privilege is rendered
doubly important in those jurisdictions in which certain future de-
fendants may be compelled to appear as witnesses. 5 Future de-
fendants, to whom the proper exercise of the privilege is especially
crucial, have been classified as de jure, de facto, or merely potential
defendants.5 6 A de jure defendant is a witness who, at the time of
his appearance, is already formally charged with the crime being
investigated or against whom an indictment is pending;57 whereas a
z Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See Silverstein, supra note 23.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (see note 7 supra), implicitly overruling
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908). In Malloy, the Court purported to reject
the "notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a 'watered-
down, subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights'...." 378
U.S. at 10-11. See also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
' See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
5 See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
58Although some states have ruled that their constitutional privileges against
self-incrimination prevent the calling of de jure or de facto defendants by the grand
jury (see note 32 supra and accompanying text), the absence of a general rule
to this effect as a matter of federal constitutional law (see note 31 supra and accom-
panying text) underscores the importance of proper invocation of the privilege during
testification. See notes 60-64 infra and accompanying text.
The distinctions adopted here to differentiate among future defendants comport
with certain holdings as to the relevant factors on which compulsory appearance may
or may not be had. As a practical matter, however, it is clear that the danger of self-
incrimination may be equally significant to all of these witnesses since the only differ-
ence among their situations is the point in time at which they became the target of
the inquiry. See Note, 45 IowA L. REv. 564 (1960); Note, 67 YALE L.J. 1271 (1958).
The particular terminology employed here is not widely adopted by the courts. Cf.
United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232, 233 (N.D. Ill. 1963). Nevertheless, the
distinctions may be of some analytical assistance in discussing the grand jury witness.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Cleary, 164 F. Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 265 F.2d 459
(2d Cir. 1959); United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (indictments
dismissed for calling de jure defendant to obtain incriminating evidence); State v.
Clifford, 86 Iowa 550, 53 N.W. 299 (1892) (reversing conviction for failure to warn de
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de facto defendant is strongly suspected of being criminally involved
in the activities under investigation but has not been formally
charged.5 8  On the other hand, a potential defendant is a witness
whose criminal activities are unknown to the grand jury but who is
threatened with exposure during the course of the proceeding. 0
Effective use of the privilege is essential, considering the extent
to which testimony given before the grand jury may be used to the
detriment of the witness. In addition to providing information for
the formulation of an indictment, the testimony is available to the
prosecution for building a case against the witness.60 Moreover,
testimony voluntarily given before a grand jury may be admitted in
a subsequent trial where the rules of evidence permit."' Thus, such
testimony has been introduced as an out-of-court admission to im-
peach trial testimony, to refresh memory, and to prove a criminal
charge of perjury.62  However, the continued validity of the use of
jure defendant of privilege against self-incrimination). Compare United States V.
Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511 (N.D. Il. 1954), with United States v. Grossman, 154 F.
Supp. 813 (D.N.J. 1957).
" See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897
(1955) (no need to advise witness of privilege where he was not formally charged with
the crime under investigation); Burke v. State, 104 Ohio St. 220, 135 N.E. 644 (1922).
"See, e.g., United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp. 511, 517 (N.D. Ill. 1954), where
the status of merely potential defendant was urged by the prosecution as a decisive
factor. The court, however, felt that such a classification of the witness would not
advance the inquiry.
6o "Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury other than its delibera-
tions and the vote of any juror may be made to the attorneys for the government for
use in the performance of their duties." FED. R. Caim. P. 6 (e). See also DEL. SUPER.
CT. (CraM.) R. 6 (e); IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-810 (Supp. 1966); MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 39
(1957).
61 See McCoamxca, EVIDENCE § 150 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCORMIcK]; 8 WIc-
MORE § 2363; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1404 (1949).
02 The admission at trial of the contents of a grand jury proceeding necessitates the
circumvention of many obstacles. First, the grand jury testimony must fall within
an exception to the hearsay rule: e.g., Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418-
21 (1957) (dictum on impeachment); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S.
150, 231-34 (1940) (refresh witness' memory); United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1959) (operative fact in perjury prosecution); Metzler
v. United States, 64 F.2d 203, 206 (9th Cir. 1933) (confession); United States v. Cotter,
60 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 666 (1932) (impeachment); United
States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (admission); People v.
Pickett, 339 Mich. 294, 63 N.W.2d 681, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 937 (1954) (admissible
under statute requiring unavailability of declarant); State v. Broughton, 29 N.C. 96
(1846) (false accusation); Huidekoper v. Cotton, 3 Watts 56 (Pa. 1834) (operative fact
for malicious prosecution).
Statutes often specify under what circumstances evidence given before a grand jury
may be introduced as hearsay at trial. A common provision authorizes the use of a
witness' testimony to impeach the witness or to prosecute him for perjury. E.g., ALA.
CoDE tit. 30, § 87 (1958); CAL. PEN. CoDE § 924.2; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 628.65 (1945);
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all grand jury testimony, procured under certain circumstances, may
be questionable in the wake of Escobedo v. Illinois63 and Miranda
v. Arizona.6"
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 259; ORE. REV. STAT. § 132.220 (1959). Other statutes permit
admission where justice will be promoted. E.g., ARiz. R. CRM. P. 107; FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 905.27 (Supp. 1965); IowA CODE § 771.24 (1962). Some provisions merely require
that the court order admissibility. E.g., Dsi. SUPER. CT. (CalM.) R. 6 (e); GA. CODE
ANN. § 59-302 (1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-1112 (1947); ILL. Ryv. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-
6 (b) (Supp. 1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1790 (1956).
Disclosure of the testimony heard by the grand jury may involve a violation of the
secrecy oath; however, the veil of secrecy exists for the benefit of the grand jurors and
the prosecution, and may be lifted where justice so requires. See United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., supra at 234; Huidekoper v. Cotton, supra at 57. It is the
secrecy requirement, however, which prevents the defendant in the subsequent trial
from wholesale access to the contents of the grand jury proceedings. See People v.
Pickett, supra. Under the Federal Rules disclosure is permitted by order of the
court. FED. R. CruM. PROC. 6 (e). See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 871-72
(1966).
As a final requisite to admissibility, the grand jury testimony must be free of the
constitutional infirmities surrounding a coerced confession or incriminating informa-
tion secured by infringement of the right to counsel. Reliance upon these grounds has
been generally unsuccessful in attempts to exclude grand jury testimony from sub-
sequent admission for at least two reasons: (1) Testification under oath is not coercion
per se. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). But cf. State v. Clifford, 86 Iowa 550, 551-
53, 53 N.W. 299, 300 (1892). (2) Decisions establishing the expanded view of the right
to counsel are of recent vintage and their impact upon grand jury proceedings is pres-
ently unclear. See notes 144-58 infra and accompanying text.
6378 U.S. 478 (1964). "The Fifth Amendment and state constitutional provisions
authorize, indeed require, inquisitorial grand jury proceedings at which a potential
defendant, in the absence of counsel is shielded against no more than compulsory
incrimination .... A grand jury witness, who may be a suspect, is interrogated and
his answers, at least until today, are admissible in evidence at trial." Id. at 497-98
(White, J., dissenting). See United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966) (Escobedo inapplicable because witness "fully aware
of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult with counsel'); People v.
Sharer, 61 Cal. 2d 869, 877-78, 395 P.2d 899, 905 (1964). Cf. United States v. Winter,
348 F.2d 204, 206 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (signed waiver); United
States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640, 641-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (court recognized the
possibility of a sixth amendment problem but found a waiver).
The effect of Escobedo and Miranda on the witness' rights is considered fully at
notes 144-58 infra and accompanying text. However, assuming arguendo that the
right to counsel accrues to the grand jury witness who has become the subject of the
inquiry, the question arises as to whether all his testimony given after this point is
inadmissible. Since the decision in Escobedo appears on its face to rest on the right
to counsel and not on the coerced confession rule (see note 147 infra and accompany-
ing text), it would appear to follow that no incriminating evidence procured by a
deprivation of counsel could be used by the government for any purpose. Thus,
whether the prosecutor attempted to use such information either to procure secondary
evidence or to discredit the defendant at the trial (e.g., by impeachment), there would
seemingly be a violation of constitutional rights. Cf. United States v. Bolden, 355
F.2d 453, 458 (7th Cir. 1966).
"The fact that Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), underscored the fifth
amendment self-incrimination basis of Escobedo might militate against the conclusion
that all incriminating evidence short of a confession be excluded. However, the
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For the future defendant in particular, the privilege against self-
incrimination may offer imperfect protection. Notwithstanding
some authority to the contrary,"5 the prevailing rule seems to be that
the grand jury witness need not be warned of his privilege66 and must
invoke it on his own initiative without the advice of counsel.,7 Nor
may the witness who apprehends danger rely upon a blanket refusal
to answer any and all questions; 68 rather, each claim of the privilege
will succeed only where it can be shown that the particular answer
would tend to subject the witness to criminal prosecution. 69 Where
the privilege has been relied upon but its assertion is challenged, the
Court held in Miranda that statements procured in contravention of the procedures
set forth "whether exculpatory or inculpatory" are inadmissible. Id. at 476-77. "In
fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used
to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given
under interrogation and thus to prove guilt by implication." Id. at 477.
65 In some states the failure to apprise a witness of his self-incrimination privilege
has produced subsequent error. E.g., State v. Clifford, 86 Iowa 550, 53 N.W. 299
(1892) (confession before grand jury "involuntary" for failure to warn); State v.
Jemison, 240 La. 787, 125 So. 2d 363 (1960); State v. Sibilia, 88 N.J. Super. 546, 212 A.2d
869 (Essex County Ct. 1965). See generally 8 WxcMoRE § 2269.
66 The rule that, the witness-whether de jure, de facto, or potential defendant-need
not be warned of his privilege appears to prevail in the federal courts. See United
States v. Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa. 1958); United States v. Manno, 118 F. Supp.
511 (N.D. Ill. 1954); United States v. Lawn, 115 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (by im-
plication). Several courts have indicated that it may be incumbent upon the grand
jury to warn de jure defendants. United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 920 (2d Cir.
1957) (dictum), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 924 (1958); Stanley v. United States, 245 F.2d
427, 434 (6th Cir. 1957) (dictum); United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 114-15 (2d
Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 897 (1955). For the view that a failure to warn
a de jure, de facto, or potential defendant will invalidate indictments, see United States
v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232, 233-34 (N.D. Ill. 1963).
Moved either by a concern for the constitutional rights of the witness or by an
attempt to avoid the rule of Escobedo (see note 147 infra), it is now common for the
prosecutor to advise the witness of his right against self-incrimination. See, e.g.,
Kitchell v. United States, 354 F.2d 715, 720 (lst Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1011 (1966); United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 967 (1966); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 955 (1965). Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966) (requiring a
warning to one who is the target of a custodial interrogation).
67 See United States v. Neff, 212 F.2d 297, 312 (3d Cir. 1954); text accompanying notes
108-18 infra.
GBEnrichi v. United States, 212 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1954). In this respect, the
dangers confronting the grand jury witness are far more acute than those facing the
subject of a police interrogation where the right to absolute silence obtains and where
the prospect of a perjury or contempt conviction is absent. But see Kitchell v. United
States, 354 F.2d 715 (lst Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966), where the prose-
cutor advised the witness that he did not have to say "anything." 354 F.2d at 720 n.9.
69 "It is not declared that he may not be compelled to testify to facts which may
impair his reputation for probity, or even tend to disgrace him but the line is drawn
at testimony that may expose him to prosecution." Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66-67
(1906).
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question of the propriety of the reliance is referred to the judge of
the court having jurisdiction over the grand jury.70 The witness has
the burden of establishing, from all of the surrounding circum-
stances, that an answer to the question might subject him to criminal
sanctions or provide a link in the chain of evidence leading to a
criminal prosecution.
71
If the judge determines that the claim of privilege is proper, the
question may go unanswered. On the other hand, if the judge con-
siders the claim to be groundless, he may order the witness to answer
the question; and if the witness at this point persists in his refusal to
testify, a contempt proceeding may be instituted.72  Only after the
witness has been found to be in contempt may he appeal the court
order denying the propriety of his claim of the privilege. 73
The witness should also be aware that he may inadvertently lose
his right to claim the privilege by operation of the doctrine of
waiver.7 4  Thus, the rule has been stated that "where criminating
facts have been voluntarily revealed, the privilege cannot be invoked
to avoid disclosure of the details."75 There is considerable room for
70It is clear that the judge and not the witness must determine whether the privi-
lege is properly invoked. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951); In re
Hitson, 177 F. Supp. 834, 839 (N.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 283 F.2d 355 (9th
Cir. 1960). ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-916 (1947); CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1324; IowA CODE § 771.10
(1962). See generally 8 WIGMORE § 2271; Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 225 (1954).
71 See Hoffman v. United States, supra note 70, at 486-87; Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950). The modem trend appears to be to allow the claim of the
privilege upon a slight showing of actual danger of future prosecution. "To sustain the
privilege, the witness need only make it evident from the question and its.implications,
considered in the setting in which it is asked, that the answer, or even an explanation
as to why it cannot be answered might be dangerous, because an injurious disclosure
might result." In re Hitson, 177 F. Supp. 834, 840 (N.D. Cal. 1959), rev'd on other
grounds, 283 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1960). See, disapproving this trend, 8 WIGmoRE § 2260.
Liberal entertainment of a grand jury witness' claim of the privilege appears warranted
when his circumstances are appreciated: "[T]he Fifth Amendment claim was made be-
fore a grand jury where Halperin was a compelled, and not a voluntary, witness; where
he was not represented by counsel; where he could summon no witnesses; and where he
had no opportunity to cross-examine witnesses testifying against him." Grunewald v.
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 422 (1957).
72 See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
73 This conclusion is implicit in Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965) (re-
quiring a hearing before a contempt is found).
71 See generally MCCORMICK § 130; 8 WIGMORE §§ 2275-76; Note, 61 YALE L.J. 105
(1952); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 225 (1954).
71 Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373 (1951); accord, Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591, 597 (1896); United States v. St. Pierre, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir.), dismissed
as moot, 319 U.S. 41 (1942). It would appear that if the custodial interrogation rules
of Miranda were to be made applicable to the grand jury witness, the doctrine of waiver
might no longer obtain. Miranda dearly permits the person interrogated to stop at
any point. 384 U.S. at 474.
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abuse in the application of this standard in the grand jury context
since the witness is not entitled to the advice of counsel in framing
his answers or selecting the questions that he will answer.76 Because
of the "perverse effect" which the doctrine of waiver may have,77 a
limited exception to its operation has been created where the "de-
tails" which the witness refuses to give constitute necessary elements
in proof of the crime.78 Furthermore, the failure to claim the privi-
lege while testifying before the grand jury does not waive the privi-
lege with respect to the same inquiry in a subsequent trial.70
The privilege may also be rendered inapplicable by a statutory
grant of immunity to the recalcitrant witness.8 0 Immunity statutes
are frequently employed in federal and state grand jury proceedings.
Long recognized as a valuable means of procuring otherwise pro-
tected information, valid immunity provisions are bottomed on the
principle that the privilege against self-incrimination applies only
where the testimony could lead to'criminal prosecution.81 Thus, in
order for a grant of immunity to supplant fifth amendment pro-
tection, it must effectively insulate the witness from criminal prosecu-
78 See, e.g., Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951). The doctrine of waiver has
reached climactic notoriety through its production of the predicamental situation so
often faced by the much publicized witness before legislative investigating committees.
Witnesses so situated, however, are allowed the advice of counsel in treading the fine
line which separates a waiver by partial disclosure from contemptible refusal to
answer non-incriminating questions. See Washington Post, Aug. 19, 1966, p. 1, where
it is reported that Chairman Pool of the House Committee on Un-American Activities
terminated a hearing after the witness' counsel had been forcibly ejected on the an-
nounced grounds that continued questioning might be in violation of the witness'
rights.
7 8 WIGMoRE § 2276.
78 United States v. Courtney, 236 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1956).
70 E.g., In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1953); Ex parte Sales, 134 Cal. App. 54, 24
P.2d 916 (Dist. Ct. App. 1933); People v. Walker, 28 Ill. 2d 585, 192 N.E.2d 819 (1963).
See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 1403 (1954).
80The immunity grants are statutory and vary in their operation. The statute
may extend immunity automatically to one who is called to testify as provided, for
example, in the Sherman Act § 1, 32 Stat. 904 (1903), 15 U.S.C. § 32 (1964), which is
explicated in United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943). See ALA. CoDE tit. 28,
§ 90 (13) (1958); ALA. CoDE tit. 29, §§ 171, 234 (1958). Immunity from prosecution may
be provided only after the witness has claimed the privilege against self-incrimination.
E.g., Securities Exchange Act § 22, 48 Stat. 86 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77v (c) (1964); Mica.
STAT. ANN. § 28.946 (1954). The statute also may empower the grand jury to confer
immunity from prosecution, e.g., N.Y. PEN. CoDE § 2447 (3) (c), or leave this discretion
to the court, e.g., ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, § 106.1 (1964). Absent a statutory provision
to the contrary, the mere calling of a witness by the grand jury does not confer im-
munity from prosecution with regard to the subject matter of the testimony. United
States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 307 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
81 See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 594 (1896).
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tion for any acts disclosed by his testimony. 2 The Supreme Court
in Counselman v. Hitchcock8 3 held that the validity of immunity
statutes was dependent upon complete prosecutorial dispensation,
rendering ineffective those provisos which guaranteed only that
the testimony would not be used in a subsequent trial.s4 Some state
constitutions, in probable violation of the fourteenth amendment,8 5
presently purport to replace the privilege by the type of "immunity
against use" provisions which the Court struck down in Counsel-
man.86
82 Because a valid grant of immunity presupposes insulation from prosecution, the
question has frequently arisen as to the necessity and power of the conferring juris-
diction to guarantee such insulation from prosecution in other jurisdictions. At an
early date it was held that the federal government had the power to grant immunity
from federal and state prosecution under the supremacy clause. Brown v. Walker,
supra note 81, at 606-07; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 429-31, 434-36 (1956).
Furthermore, the policy and logic of Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964),
would seem to make immunity from state prosecution automatic when immunity
is granted pursuant to federal statute. See United States v. Harris, 334 F.2d 460, 462
(2d Cir. 1964), reud, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
Until Murphy, however, a state grant of immunity did not necessitate insulation
from federal prosecution with respect to the matters under inquiry. In that case a
state investigatory commission conferred immunity from state prosecution but the
witness refused to answer the questions fearing possible fedeial prosecution. In re-
versing the subsequent contempt conviction, the Court remanded and ordered the wit-
ness to answer the questions but stipulated that the federal government could use
neither the testimony so elicited nor its fruits. 378 US. at 79-80. A rule of exclusion
apparently emerges from Murphy under which a state must confer immunity from
prosecution under its own laws; and by so doing, it puts beyond the immediate reach
of the federal government the information so obtained. Thus, while the witness need
not (and cannot) be granted immunity from federal prosecution by the state, federal
prosecution, in theory at least, will not be aided by operation of the state statute.
At present, however, there would appear to be no rule to prevent the use in one
state of information elicited by another state by operation of an immunity statute.
The most desirable solution to this problem is exemplified in the Illinois immunity
act, which preconditions its operation on the absence of any threat of prosecution for
matters testified about in all other jurisdictions. ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1064 (1964).
A- 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
81 "[N]o statute which leaves the ... witness subject to prosecution after he answers
the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting the privilege
conferred by the Constitution of the United States." Id. at 585.
85 The following state constitutional provisions purport to sanction "immunity
against use" only, but probably are invalid under Malloy v. Hogan, 378 US. 1 (1964)
and Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 US. 547 (1892): LA. CoNsr., art. 19, § 13; PA. CONST.,
art. 3, §32. But see State v. Rodrigues, 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756 (1951), and Com-
monwealth v. Cameron, 229 Pa. 592, 79 At. 169 (1911), upholding these provisions on
the authority of Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), which was implicitly over-
ruled by Malloy v. Hogan, supra.
88 Even before the extension of the fifth amendment doctrine of Counselman
through the fourteenth amendment, the majority of states had concluded that under
state self-incrimination guarantees the "immunity against use" statutes were invalid.
E.g., People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 68 N.E. 353 (1903); Common-
wealth v. Frank, 159 Pa. Super. 271, 48 A.2d 10 (1946).
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Where the witness persists in his refusal to answer questions after
a tender of immunity, the matter is referred to the court, which
decides if the immunity is operative; upon a determination that im-
munity has been effectively granted, the witness may be ordered to
answer.87 If the witness then continues to insist on the inefficacy of
the immunity, he is subject to contempt proceedings for violation
of the court's order.8 8
It is thus apparent that reliance upon the privilege against self-
incrimination by the inexperienced grand jury witness presents a
serious dilemma since an answer may expose the witness to severe
hardships or penalties, while improper refusal to respond may result
in punishment for contempt.8 9 The law of contempt may have
special significance for the grand jury witness because of the pro-
cedural peculiarities involved. After the witness has claimed his
privilege, been ordered by the judge to answer the questions, and
returned to the grand jury room only to disregard the order, invoca-
tion of contempt proceedings are appropriate. 00 In the state courts
87 Where the grand jury itself is empowered to confer immunity (see note 80 supra),
immediate appeal to the court on the question of the applicability of the immunity
provisions may be precluded so long as the immunity is in fact sufficient. People v.
Riela, 9 App. Div. 2d 481, 195 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1959), remanded for resentencing, 7 N.Y.2d
571, 200 N.Y.S.2d 43 (1960); People v. Franzese, 24 Misc. 2d 355, 202 N.Y.S.2d 753 (Kings
County Ct. 1960).
8 8 E.g., Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1955); Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S.
591 (1896). But see People v. Franzese, supra note 87, where a refusal to answer ques-
tions after the grand jury had conferred immunity constituted a completed contempt.
In New York it has been held that if a prospective defendant has reasonable
grounds to believe that the grant of immunity is not complete, a refusal to answer
is not punishable as a contempt. People v. DeFeo, 308 N.Y. 595, 127 N.E.2d 592 (1955)
(reversing contempt conviction).
In order to confer immunity and supplant the privilege against self-incrimination,
the state has the burden of showing the applicability of the immunity proviso. Stevens
v. Marks, 883 U.S. 234, 244-46 (1966).
11 The defendant in United States v. Winter, 848 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 955 (1965) (perjury conviction affirmed), envisioned himself on the horns of
a "trilemma." Confronted with a blunt question as to his guilt or innocence, the
defendant saw as his alternatives the distasteful choices of (1) admitting his guilt,
(2) claiming the fifth amendment privileges and prejudicing the grand jury, or (8)
lying and risking a perjury prosecution. He selected the third alternative but found
the court unsympathetic to his plight.
90 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); Brown v. United States,
359 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1959) (overruled by Harris); Hooley v. United States, 209 F.2d 219
(1st Cir. 1954). But see People v. Cochran, 807 II. 126, 138 N.E. 291 (1923); State v.
Rodrigues, 219 La. 217, 52 So. 2d 756 (1951); Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 887, 82
A.2d 773 (1951) (where the defendant was not sent back to the grand jury after being
ordered by the judge to answer, but was immediately cited for contempt for persisting
in refusal). Cf. State v. Rodrigues, supra, where the court observed: "The grand jury
. . . is a constituent part, appendage, or arm of the court, and contempt committed
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where a summary contempt proceeding may result, the time lapse
between these successive events may be very short indeed, and the
line separating the contemptible act from the subsequent contempt
proceeding may be transparent."- Nevertheless, the witness is per-
mitted time to consult with his counsel and may subsequently be
allowed to purge himself of the contempt by answering. 92
While the ability to confer with counsel before and during the
"separate" contempt proceedings may partially shield the witness
against compounding his adversity, other aspects of the contempt
procedure may present new hazards. The judge may find the wit-
ness to be in criminal contempt and as a result many of the ordinary
protections for criminal defendants are seriously diluted or entirely
lost-this in spite of the fact that penalties may be quite severe. 93
by a person in its presence is a direct contempt in the hearing and presence of--the
court itself." 219 La. 234-35, 52 So. 2d at 759 (dictum).
01 See, e.g., State v. Rodrigues, supra note 90; Gendron v. Burnham, supra note 90.
02Assistance from counsel should be available before the act of contempt has oc-
curred. See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960); Brown v. United States, 359
U.S. 41 (1959) (subsequently overruled on other grounds, see note 98 infra). However,
a more mechanistic view has been adopted by some courts to justify the denial of
counsel during this crucial time in which the defendant must determine his rights
to his own satisfaction under the self-incrimination privilege. See, e.g., People v.
Cochran, 307 II. 126, 138 N.E. 291 (1923) (before the completed contempt, appellant
was a "witness," not a "defendant"); State v. Rodrigues, supra note 90 (same).
Several states have outlined a statutory procedure to be followed where a grand
jury witness refuses to answer a question. Typically, the question and the refusal
are put in writing and referred to the court. The judge then decides (apparently ex
parte) whether the question ought to be answered and so informs the grand jury.
If the witness is ordered to answer and persists in his refusal, he is brought before
the court and dealt with as if he had refused to answer in open court. IND. ANN.
STAT. §§ 9-822 to -823 (1955); Mo. RFv. STAT. §§ 540.190-.200 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT.
§§ 29-1410 to -1412 (1964); Onto RaV. CODE ANN. §§ 2939.14-.15 (Page 1953). Other states
require that the witness appear before the court for a decision on the permissibility
of the refusal. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-916 (1947); IowA CODE § 771.10 (1962). By
providing a hearing, California has adopted a scheme which most fully protects the
witness against disclosing privileged matter and against punitive sanctions. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1324.
03 "[C]ontempts committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice ... may be punished in conformity to the pre-
vailing usage at law." 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1964). See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S.
367 (1951) (affirming three-year sentence for criminal contempt conviction).
The recent case of Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), would appear to raise
an interesting question with regard to the permissible punishment for criminal con-
tempt under § 402. FED. R. CalM. P. 42 (a) authorizes a summary contempt conviction
where (1) "the judge certifies that he saw or heard the [contemptible] conduct" and
(2) the conduct occurred in the "actual presence" of the court. In Harris, the Court
held that the use of summary contempt procedure in aid of a grand jury investigation
was improper (see note 95 infra). The question is the extent to which testimonial
contempts which are not punishable by summary procedure may be considered to
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Thus, a grand jury indictment9 or a petit jury verdict9 5 may not be
retained as procedural requisites. Furthermore, since the time lapse
from the completed contempt to the subsequent conviction may be
quite short, the prospect of a public trial 6 with due notice and the
accompanying opportunity to prepare a defense9 7 may be obscured.
However, a recent decision of the Supreme Court has rejected the
practice in federal courts of using summary contempts to punish a
witness for a wrongful refusal to answer questions under a claim of
the fifth amendment.98
have been "committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice" for purposes of the severe penalties of § 402. The maxi-
mum penalty for contempts which do not fall within the above-quoted language is
$1,000 fine and six months imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1964).
As an alternative to criminal contempts, the court may cite the witness for civil
contempt and order him incarcerated until he purges the contempt by answering
the propounded queries. See Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
1" Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 184 (1958).
95 E.g., People v. Burkert, 7 IM. 2d 506, 510, 131 N.E.2d 495, 498 (1955).
The practice with respect to jury trials for criminalg contemnors in federal courts
has recently been modified. In Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958), the Court
declined to narrow the language of Fmn. R. CPlM. P. 42 (b) which provides, in part:
"A criminal contempt except as provided in subdivision (a) [summary contempt] of
this rule shall be prosecuted on notice .... The defendant is entitled to a trial by
jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides .... Situations where the
defendant in a contempt prosecution was entitled by statute to a trial by jury are set
forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1964) (relating to certain criminal contempts) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3692 (1964) (relating to contempts arising in labor disputes).
In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), as an exercise of its supervisory power
over the federal courts but in language that smacked of constitutional interpretation,
the Court ruled that before a defendant can be sentenced to six months or more for
criminal contempt of a federal court, he is entitled to a trial by jury. Id. at 380.
However, in a companion case, Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966), the Court
distinguished the criminal contempt from the civil contempt and held that where the
condemnor has an "unqualified right to be released if and when he obeyed the order
to testify," id. at 367, the contempt is civil in nature and hence requires no jury trial.
Id. at 365.
91 See Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960). But cf. Cheff v. Schnackenberg,
supra note 95; Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965).
'7 E.g., Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 402-03, 82 A.2d 773, 783 (1951). Cf. State
v. Granchay, 1 Ohio App. 2d 307, 204 N.E.2d 562 (1964).
At some point, a combination of aggravating factors which deprive the defendant
of counsel, a public trial, and an opportunity to prepare a defense may exceed the
bounds of due process. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
98 In Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959), the Court sanctioned the power of
a federal court to convict a witness summarily "in aid of a grand jury investigation"
under FED. R. CiuM. P. 42 (a). In Brown the recalcitrant witness was taken from the
grand jury and escorted before the judge where he was ordered to answer the ques.
tions in response to which he had initially claimed the privilege. The contempt cita-
tation followed a renewed refusal, and a subsequent motion for a later hearing on the
contempt charge under FED. R. GuRm. P. 42 (b) was held to have been properly denied.
In Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965), the Court expressly overruled Brown
and held that unless the defendant's conduct imperiled the order of the proceeding or
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B. Other privileges
In addition to self-incrimination, the witness may be able to rely
on certain other privileges. While the grand jury witness is not
allowed to interpose objections to questions on the grounds of strict
evidentiary rules insuring relevance"9 or probity, 00 he may be able
to avoid answering by invoking applicable common law or statutory
privileges. A refusal to answer is justified where the information
sought is protected from disclosure by the husband-wife privilege,' 0 '
the attorney-client privilege, 10 2 the physician-patient privilege, 03 or
other similar rules guarding against revelation or protecting rela-
tionships.11°4
affronted the dignity of the court, prosecution for contempt should proceed under rule
42 (b), i.e., not summarily. The holding in Harris, however, is limited to contempt
proceedings under the Federal Rules, apparently leaving the use of summary contempts
in state courts intact. See Note, 1966 DuxE L.J. 814.
00 The objection of irrelevance raised by a grand jury witness must rest on the
assumption that the matter under inquiry is beyond the grand jury's jurisdiction to
investigate. Conceivably, this objection might succeed, especially where the immediate
purpose of the investigation is limited, as in the case of the so-called "special" grand
jury. However, since the breadth of the grand jury's proper scope is often unlimited
(see note 22 supra and accompanying text), an objection on the grounds of irrelevancy
will probably fail. Thus, it has been said that "the scope of [the grand jury's] . . .
powers may not be cut down by the witness. The identity of the offender and the
precise crime involved will normally be developed at the end rather than the beginning
of its labors." Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 895 (1959).
10O See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956) (holding valid an indictment
based entirely on hearsay evidence). There the Court stated that "if indictments were
to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was inadequate or incompetent
evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay would be great indeed. The result
of such a rule would be that before trial on the merits a defendant could always insist
on a kind of preliminary trial to determine the competency and adequacy of the
evidence before the grand jury. This is not required by the Fifth Amendment. An
indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an informa-
tion, if valid on its face, is enough to call for the trial of the charge on the merits."
Id. at 363. A substantial number of states reject this position. See note 23 supra.
ox E.g., Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951); United States v. Reming-
ton, 208 F.2d 567, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913
(1954).
102 United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963) (involving subpoena duces
tecum); Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.) (court found waiver), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956); United States v. Lee, 107 Fed. 702 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1901)
(communication not within privilege); Ex parte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566
(1915); Ex parte Bruns, 15 Cal. App. 2d 1, 58 P.2d 1318 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936) (com-
munication not within privilege).
In New York the same recognition of statutory privileges is assured by the statutory
"legal evidence" rule set out in note 23 supra. People ex rel. Vogelstein v. Warden,
150 Misc. 714, 270 N.Y. Supp. 362 (Sup. Ct.) (by implication), aff'd, 242 App. Div. 611,
271 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1934).
120 E.g., Application of Grand Jury, 286 App. Div. 270, 143 N.Y.S.2d 501 (1955).
101 Certainly the policies which support the various statutory privileges would not
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The full enjoyment of these statutory privileges by the witness
may be effectively precluded because of the special circumstances of
the grand jury context. First, the absence of the person to whom
the privilege belongs may debilitate its diligent exertion. 105 Second,
the secrecy of the grand jury proceeding may undermine the policy
of the privilege and make it inapplicable. 106 Finally, the absence
of the judge at the grand jury session may remove an important
defender of these privileges.107
C. Right to counsel
Considering the susceptibility of the witness' rights to erosion
and the dangers which a misplaced reliance on these rights may in-
volve, it is evident that a grand jury appearance may represent a
serious threat to the uninformed witness. The important values
supporting the witness' rights, as well as the witness' interest in
freedom from conflict with the authority of the court, would cer-
tainly be more securely insured if counsel were afforded during
testification to advise the witness of the legal intricacies which his
appearance might involve.
American courts have consistently held that the scope of a "crim-
inal prosecution," for purposes of the sixth amendment's guarantee
of counsel, does not encompass the grand jury proceeding. 08 De-
justify a distinction between testimony given at trial and that given before a grand
jury. Since, as Professor McCormick has observed, "their sole warrant is the pro-
tection of interests and relationships which . . . are regarded as of sufficient social
importance to justify some incidental sacrifice of sources of facts needed in the admin-
istration of justice," the privileges' purposes may be defeated by any disclosure which
is compelled by and before the government. See Annot., 133 A.L.R. 732 (1941). For
an express statutory provision recognizing privileged communications, see MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.945 (1) (1954).
205 See, e.g., United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1953) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954); Wickline v. Alvis, 103 Ohio App. 1,
144 N.E2d 207 (1957).
21o The trade secrets privilege is one such privilege subject to vitiation because the
grand jury operates in seclusion. Application of Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D.
167, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (involving subpoena duces tecum).
Professor Wigmore has observed: "The simple expedient of restricting the disclosure
to the judge or his delegate will usually prevent whatever detriment might otherwise be
incurred by forcing a public revelation of the trade secret." 8 WIGMORE § 2212. Thus,
the policy factors of the privilege are absent in the context of the in camera grandjury.
j 07 See McCoRMICK § 73, at 153, where the author refers to the "usual willingness of
trial courts of their own motion to safeguard the privileges."
101 E.g., In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (dictum); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892) (dictum); Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 203 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942); In re Black, 47 F.2d 542, 543 (2d Cir. 1931);
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veloped at a time when the scope of the criminal prosecution was
viewed as limited to the trial itself, this rule was thought to prevent
the grand jury from becoming a preliminary adjudicatory forum in
which various formalities could be injected to obstruct orderly
prosecutions. The courts treated requests for the benefit of counsel
by indicted defendants as broad assertions that the grand jury pro-
ceeding was a step in the criminal prosecution amounting to a part
of the criminal trial.109 No clear attempt was made to distinguish
the de jure or de facto defendant from one who had been indicted by
the grand jury but had not been a witness before that body."0
Thus, in rejecting the defendant's objection that his indictment was
fatally defective because he was denied representation by counsel
before the grand jury, the courts denied alike the related sixth
amendment rights to face one's accusers and to present evidence in
defense."'. The reasons given for excluding the attorney of the
person being investigated are obvious: the grand jury proceedings
should not be a full-scale preliminary trial to the detriment of the
public interest in speedy adjudication; 1 2 the presence of the accused's
United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United States v.
Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812, 816 (E.D. Mo. 1948); People v. Dale, 79 Cal. App. 2d 370,
376, 179 P.2d 870, 873 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947); State v. Stallings, 25 Conn. Supp. 386, 389,
206 A.2d 277, 278 (Super. Ct. 1964); Ferris v. Lockett, 175 Kan. 704, 712, 267 P.2d 190,
197, rev'd per curiam sub nom. Courtney v. Schroeder, 348 U.S. 933 (1955). Cf. Anony-
mous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) (clearly requires that counsel
be excluded from the grand jury room). But see Cadle v. State, 101 Ga. App. 175, 113
S.E.2d 180 (1960), involving a statute extending additional safeguards to the grand jury
proceeding in cases of alleged misfeasance in public office.
At present, only one court appears to have allowed the witness to consult his
counsel during the grand jury proceeding as a matter of constitutional right. People
v. laniello, 35 U.S.L. W= 2003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 24, 1966).
109 Indicative of this approach is the distinction drawn in Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892), where the Court held the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination applicable to the grand jury but rejected in dicta the contention that
such a conclusion would necessitate application of sixth amendment rights to the
same proceeding.
The Court stated that the right to counsel provision refers to "a criminal prosecu-
tion against a person who is accused and who is tried by a petit jury. A criminal
prosecution under article 6 of the amendments, is much narrower than a 'criminal
case,' under article 5 of the amendments." Id. at 563.
110 Obviously, one who is indicted may or may not have been a witness just as a
witness need not have been indicted. One who is both a witness and is subsequently
indicted may in turn be a de jure, de facto, or potential defendant. As to the latter
classification, see notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
" In re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931); State v. Stallings, 25 Conn. Supp. 386,
206 A.2d 277 (Super. Ct. 1964). See also notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
112 See, e.g., United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). This
objection may assume that the presence of accused's counsel would be an invitation to
a preliminary trial.
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counsel would jeopardize the valuable incidents of grand jury secre-
cy;113 the grand jury does not adjudicate guilt;11 4 the presence of the
accused's counsel would hamper the freedom of the grand jury and
the prosecutor in their investigation;" 5 and the establishment of the
identity of the accused may often not be made until some later point
in the course of the investigation." 6 The shorthand conclusion based
upon the foregoing premises has been that the grand jury proceeding
is not part of the criminal prosecution within the meaning of the
sixth amendment.117
In denying the right to counsel during the grand jury proceeding,
the courts deprived the defendant of a sword *With which he could
sabotage the machinery of justice. However, the rule has been ex-
tended to the distinguishable situation in which a witness (whether
subsequently indicted or not) seeks to employ counsel as a shield
during testification."18 Where the 'witness asserts the right to be
accompanied bycounsel, many of the reasons set forth for denying
this advantage to the person under indictment are inoperative. It
is unlikely that the presence of the witness' attorney would result in
undue delay"a9 or that any of the valid policy reasons supporting the
118 Many of the reasons given in note 24 supra for the secrecy requirement would
seem to dictate that defendant's counsel be excluded.
314'See, e.g., State v. Guay, 25 Conn. Supp. 61, 65, 196 A.2d 599, 601 (Super. Ct.
1963). But cf. observation of Judge Frank, note 41 supra.
xx5Allowing the accused's counsel to be present during the grand jury proceedings
would certainly "open up knowledge of the government's case," a result inconsistent
with the dictates of policy. See States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 304 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
216 The fact that accusations by the grand jury are often the end products of the
investigation would make impossible the extension of adversary rights to the accused.
See comments by Professor Orfield, note 99 supra.
11 See, e.g., Gilmore v. United States, 129 F.2d 199, 203 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 631 (1942); Ferris v. Lockett, 175 Kan. 704, 712, 267 P.2d 190, 197 (1954), rev'd
per curiam sub nom. Courtney v. Schroeder, 348 U.S. 933 (1955).
2281n re Black, 47 F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931). "But the privilege against self-incrim-
ination is personal. Neither at a trial nor before a grand jury is he entitled to have
the aid of counsel when testifying .... A witness is not entitled to be furnished with
facilities for evading issues or concealing true facts." Id. at 543. See also United States
v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). But cf. Kitchell v. United States, 354
F.2d 715, 720 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966) (distinguished Escobedo);
United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 199 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967
(1966); United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 208 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955
(1965) (even if Escobedo applied, denial of right to counsel would not cure perjury).
119 In light of the "valid-on-its-face" doctrine of Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359, 363 (1956) (note 100 supra), it cannot be said that counsel for the witness could
delay the proceeding, since technical grounds for objections are not permitted. See
also note 93 supra. Some delay might result from counsel's assistance in urging the
invocation of applicable privileges, but the policy factors supporting these privileges
would seem to warrant the slight inconveniences necessary to preserve them. Certainly
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secrecy requirement would be subverted. 120  While it is probable
that the presence of the witness' counsel might inhibit the investi-
gatory freedom of the prosecutor and the grand jury, to the extent
that this freedom is purchased at the direct expense of the witness
its value is highly questionable. 21
Recognizing the special dangers which compulsory appearance
without counsel poses for the grand jury witness who is also a
prospective defendant, many jurisdictions have pursued courses of
action which allay these threats to some degree. In some states de
jure and de facto defendants cannot be called 22 and in others this
practice is permitted but not encouraged. 23  Still other jurisdictions
permit the witness' counsel to wait in an adjoining room to advise
his client during periodic recesses which are liberally granted for
this very purpose.1 24  Only Michigan has abandoned the no-counsel
this judgment would appear valid in view of the fact that the law presently regards
the privileges highly enough to allow them to obstruct the search for truth at the
threshold of inquiry.
120 The presence of the witness' counsel, who, for conceptual clarity and due to the
identity of interests, can be considered his alter ego, would not appear to threaten the
accomplishment of secrecy policies enumerated in note 24 supra. While the presence
of counsel might inhibit some disclosures, he could only do so where the law already,
for one reason or another, recognizes the paramount right of the witness not to answer.
It has been argued that allowing the witness' counsel to attend could subvert
the objectives of a grand jury investigation of a criminal group, the members of which
all have the same lawyer. Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United
States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. Rav. 47, 74 n.84 (1964). However, the wit-
ness is generally not prevented by oath from disclosing the nature of his testimony.
See note 27 supra. In any event, serious constitutional questions would arise where
a secrecy oath was interpreted to prohibit a witness from telling his own counsel the
nature of his grand jury testimony. See Goodman v. United States, 108 F.2d 516,
520-21 (9th Cir. 1939) (dictum); ILTL. RV. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-6 (Supp. 1965) (by impli-
cation, allows the witness to divulge the content of his testimony).
121 Counsel for the witness could be expected to discourage the prosecutor's efforts
to acquire privileged information, but it is exactly this effort which the law condemns
in recognizing the privilege. To create privileges and at the same time inhibit
their effective use is paradoxical indeed.
Any proposed extension of the witness' right to counsel would certainly meet im-
measurable, and conceivably irrational, opposition from prosecutors who dearly prize
their preferred relationship with the grand jury. Another lawyer in the room might
be considered a threat to the control and influence the prosecutor could wield. How-
ever, it is a common criticism of the grand jury that it has already been allowed to
fall prey to the prosecutor's control. See Note, 72 YALE L.J. 590, 592-93 (1963).
But see United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 301 (1952).
122 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
123 See, e.g., United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113, 116 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 897 (1955); Gendron v. Burnham, 146 Me. 387, 397, 82 A.2d 773, 780-81 (1951);
Burke v. State, 104 Ohio St. 220, 231, 135 N.E. 644, 647 (1922).
124 See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (1960); Kitchell v. United States,
354 F.2d 715, 720 n.9 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1011 (1966); United States
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rule by statute to permit a witness to be accompanied by his attorney
while testifying.125
While decisions holding that the grand jury proceeding is not
per se a part of the sixth amendment's criminal prosecution appear
sound, it does not follow that a grand jury proceeding is per se not
a part of the "criminal prosecution" as that concept has been de-
veloped in recent Supreme Court decisions. From the standpoint
of the grand jury witness who is either marked for prosecution prior
to the proceeding or is singled out during its course, the criminal
prosecution for purposes of the sixth amendment would already
seem to have commenced. In this connection, an analysis of three
recent Supreme Court decisions-In re Groban, 26 Escobedo v.
Illinois, 27 and Miranda v. Arizona'28-is especially relevant.
In Groban a divided Court held that a witness under subpoena
did not have a constitutional right to be assisted by counsel during
interrogation by a state fire marshal who was required by statute to
investigate the causes of fires.129  Over a vigorous dissent, the Court
held that there was no right to counsel because the investigation
was not a "criminal prosecution" within the meaning of the sixth
amendment. s0 To the majority, the gravamen of a "criminal
prosecution" was the adjudication of rights and liabilities, and thus a
witness in a proceeding in which no legal relationships were formally
v. Tramunti, 343 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1965); United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640,
641 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In People v. Ianiello, 35 U.S.L. WEEK 2003 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 24,
1966), the failure to allow the witness to consult with his counsel was held to have been
a violation of the witness' constitutional right.
22 "Any person called before the grand jury shall at all times be entitled to legal
counsel not involving delay and he may discuss fully with his counsel all matters
relative to his part in the inquiry without being subject to a citation for contempt.
The witness shall have the right to have counsel present in the room where the in-
quiry is held." MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.943 (Supp. 1965). Both the witness and his counsel
are sworn to secrecy. Ibid.
It should be noted that the additional safeguards afforded by Michigan are prob-
ably not altogether unrelated to the notorious "one-man grand jury" institution of that
jurisdiction. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Scigliano, Inquisitorial Proceedings
and Separation of Functions: the Case of the Michigan One-Man Grand Jury, 38 U.
DEr. L.J. 82 (1960).
12 352 U.S. 330 (1957).
12" 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
128 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
129 The fire marshal also had the power to initiate a criminal prosecution by filing
an information against suspected arsonists. Ohio Gen. & Local Acts 1902, No. 872,
§ 409-52, at 472 (now OHio REv. CoDE ANN. § 3737.10 (Page Supp. 1965)).
130 352 U.S. at 332.
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determined was not entitled to the benefit of sixth amendment
guarantees.131
In certain respects the approach taken by Mr. Justice Black in
his dissent is similar to that adopted by the majority eight years later
in Escobedo.32 Justice Black did not dwell extensively upon the
power of the marshal to initiate prosecutions133 nor did he rely upon
a mechanistic distinction between an in camera administrative hear-
ing and a trial. 134 Rather, he emphasized the characteristics of the
hearing in which the appellant found himself. The dissent stressed
the adverse consequences which might follow from making a lay
witness exercise his right against self-incrimination unaided by
counsel, 3 5 and underscored the danger of inadvertent or ignorant
self-exposure inherent in compulsory uncounseled testification.136
These considerations led the minority to conclude:
The Due Process Clause requires that a person interrogated be
allowed to use legal counsel whenever he is compelled to give
testimony to law-enforcement officers which may be instrumental
in his prosecution and conviction for a criminal offense.137
Clearly the evils the dissenters envisioned in Groban may be
present in the grand jury proceeding. However, Mr. Justice Black
expressly disavowed the possibility that he would have extended the
right of counsel to one who (in other respects similarly situated to
Groban) was compelled to testify before a grand jury. 38 He dis-
tinguished the grand jury situation from the facts in Groban on the
grounds that the grand jury, unlike the fire marshal, was less con-
cerned with securing convictions than with protecting its fellow
citizens. 39 Such an assumption, when applied indiscriminately to
181 "Prosecution of an individual differs widely from administrative investigation of
incidents damaging to the economy or dangerous to the public. The proceeding
before the Fire Marshal was not a criminal trial, nor was it an administrative proceed-
ing that would in any way adjudicate appellants' responsibilities for the fire." Ibid.
182 See text accompanying notes 143-44 infra.
188 Cf. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287, 298 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
"", "The right to use counsel at the formal trial is a very hollow thing when, for
all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination." 352
U.S. at 344.
"I" Id. at 345-46.
118 Id. at 344.
187 Ibid.
23
8 Id. at 346-47.
21 1 "[A]ny surface support the grand jury practice may lend disappears upon analysis
of that institution .... [The grand jurors] . . . bring into the grand jury room the ex-
perience, knowledge and viewpoint of all sections of the community .... [T]he
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every grand jury under the guidance of a prosecuting attorney,
would seem to be excessively optimistic and quite untenable.140
Therefore, despite the dicta concerning the grand jury situation, it
is reasonable to conclude that with the rejection of In re Groban
the grand jury witness's right to counsel might be recognized.
For several reasons it would appear that In re Groban has been
sapped of its vitality by Escobedo v. Illinois, which in turn has been
reinforced by Miranda v. Arizona. In addition to the fact that the
four dissenting justices in Groban constituted four-fifths of the
majorities in Escobedo and Miranda,14' the Court in Escobedo cited
the dissent in Groban for the broad public policy dictating a need
for counsel during a "pretrial examination."'42 Moreover, the under-
pinnings of Groban cannot be reconciled with the assumptions under-
lying or the objectives behind the more recent Court pronounce-
ments. 48
In Escobedo the defendant was convicted of a capital offense
after a trial during which the court admitted a "voluntary" con-
fession M procured by the police after extended questioning.'4"
presence of the jurors offers a substantial safeguard against officers' misrepresentation,
unintentional or otherwise, of witness' statements and conduct before the grand
jury." Ibid. Accord, Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 498 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
1
,
0 The attitude which gives the grand jury the conclusive benefit of all doubts
would appear, both in the light of grand jury tactics revealed in the casees and upon
a closer examination of the operations of that body, to be naive and unrealistic. See
United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, L., J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913 (1954); Coates, The Grand Jury, the Prosecutor's Puppet,
33 PA. B.A.Q. 311, 315 (1962). It appears to overlook the following practices:
(I) Failing to warn witnesses, whether suspected or not, of their privilege against
self-incrimination, see note 66 supra;
(2) Permitting the active participation of the prosecuting attorney, who may well
be interested in obtaining convictions, in the grand jury investigation, see note 121
supra; and
(3) Calling prospective defendants to interrogate them under oath about crimes
they are suspected of having committed, see note 31 supra and accompanying text.
See also United States v. Bergman, 354 F.2d 931 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Rosen,
353 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966); United States v. Winter,
348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965), epitomizing the abuses of the
inquisitorial tactics of some grand juries. In those cases, the defendants were asked
under oath if they committed named criminal acts. The denials in response led to
perjury convictions.
"' Justices Black, Douglas, Warren and Brennan.
142 378 U.S. at 487-88 (quoting the passage set forth in note 134 supra).
1,8 See note 151 inIra and accompanying text.
"14 This finding of fact based upon the unchallenged standards adopted by the lower
court was not disturbed. Thus, the particular elements of coercion present in the case
would appear to have been of only peripheral significance to the decision.
15 The interrogation continued for more than fourteen hours.
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Escobedo was not informed of his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,'4 and although he asked to see his lawyer,147 his request was
denied until the confession had been obtained.
The Court, through Mr. Justice Goldberg, reached its holding in
guarded language, with, the issue framed narrowly:
[Whether], under the circumstances, the refusal by the police to
honor petitioner's request to consult with his lawyer during the
course of an interrogation constitutes a denial of "the Assistance
of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion as "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment .... 148
The "circumstances" referred to were delineated with care and
fully elaborated. 49 This caution, reflected in the particularistic
treatment of the facts, has left a persistingly troublesome cloud over
the scope of the holding.150
118 378 U.S. at 485.
'-'7 Defendant's counsel also asked to see the accused but his request was refused.
See State v. Swiger, 5 Ohio St. 2d 151, 161, 214 N.E.2d 417, 425 (1966), where this ele-
ment of Escobedo was deemed controlling. The Court in Miranda felt that this was
a pure sixth amendment violation. 384 U.S. at 465 n.35.
111 378 U.S. at 479.
149 Among the particular "circumstances" the court may have been referring to are
the following:
(1) The period of detention;
(2) Request for counsel; see State v. Swiger, 5 Ohio St. 2d 151, 161, 214 N.E.2d 417,
425 (1966).
(3) Availability of the lawyer;
(4) The inexperience of defendant, a twenty-two-year-old of Mexican extraction;
(5) The use of a Spanish-speaking officer to coax a confession;
(6) The false promise that he could go home if he confessed;
(7) The calculation with which the confession was produced; and
(8) The failure to warn defendant of his privilege against self-incrimination. See
People v. Treloar, 64 Cal. 2d 145, 410 P.2d 620 (1966).
210 See, e.g., Edwards v. Holman, 342 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965), Wright v. Dickson,
336 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1964); Queen v. United States, 335 F.2d 297 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 440, where the Court, referring to the Escobedo
aftermath says: "[Escobedo] has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited
legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in
assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions."
Even after Miranda, the precise meaning of Escobedo is of more than mere his-
torical or academic interest. Most obviously, the Court's decision in Johnson v. New
Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), which requires only a prospective application of Miranda
and Escobedo, renders the Escobedo case of extreme importance to a multitude of
defendants whose cases were pending during the two year interim. Moreover, to the
extent that the less definite language or broad policies of Escobedo may more severely
restrict investigatorial examinations in a certain case than the relatively precise direc-
tions of Miranda, the more restrictive result is probably commanded. It is clear that
the intent of the Court in Miranda was to "adhere to the principles of Escobedo
384 U.S. at 444.
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Notwithstanding the narrow statement of the issue and the par-
ticularized treatment of the facts, there is ample and convincing
language in the opinion to indicate that the decision was intended
to have a liberal rather than a restrictive scope.- It is instructive to
note that the stated evil to be avoided was the growth of "a system
of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the 'con-
fession' ,,s' and the concomitant "cynical prosecutor" who takes the
attitude:
Let them have the most illustrious counsel now. They can't escape
the noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at
trial.152
It was apparently in furtherance of these policy objectives that the
Court concluded:
[When the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession-
our adversary system begins to operate, and... the accused must
be permitted to consult with his lawyer.' 3
The liberal reading of Escobedo is convincingly supported by the
recent amplification and extension of that decision in Miranda v.
Arizona. In the latter case the Court explained what it had meant in
Escobedo by an "investigation which had focused on an accused."
Focusing occurs when the investigation takes the form of a "custodial
interrogation," which refers to "questioning initiated by law en-
forcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'5 4
Interpreted literally, this language sweeps into its protective ambit
the grand jury witness or the witness before the fire marshal. Fur-
thermore, where the witness is a de facto or de jure defendant, his
dilemma exceeds that of the accused in police custody.
The single most perplexing question raised by Escobedo and
Miranda, insofar as those decisions might bolster the rights of a
grand jury witness, is whether actual police custody is an essential
ingredient to their application. The Court in Miranda emphasized
the innately coercive and highly disarming environment provided
2 378 U.S. at 488-89.52 Id. at 488.
1 53 Id. at 492.
25, 384 U.S. at 444.
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by the station house. It also stressed the highly developed, psycho-
logically persuasive tactics employed by skilled police interrogators
which were used to elicit confessions. Therefore, the Court con-
cluded that in order to assure that confessions were the product of
free choice consistent with the guarantees of the fifth amendment,
the assistance of counsel must be provided.155 In contrast, the
grand jury witness is confronted by a prosecuting attorney and a
group of his peers under distinguishable circumstances.
However, the distinction may be without difference, and the
situation of the grand jury witness may be far more precarious than
that of his station house counterpart. Unable to rely on any privi-
lege of absolute silence, and caught between the Scylla of contempt
or perjury and the Charybdis of indictment, the witness at the closed-
door inquisition may find it much more difficult to assert effectively
his privilege against self-incrimination. Furthermore, one may
speculate that the psychological pressures operative on the witness
are no less significant. The disarming officiousness of the grand jury,
the fear of indictment, the misplaced confidence in fellow laymen act-
ing under the direction of a conviction-minded prosecutor, the aware-
ness of the law of contempt, and the possible uncertainty as to the
legal limits of invoked immunity statutes all severely complicate a
witness' decision to respond to questions which demand incrim-
inating answers.
It is also doubtful from the holding in Miranda itself that the
aggravating circumstances assumed to exist in the police station must
in fact obtain before the constitutional guarantees enunciated in
those cases are available. Thus, the Court did not qualify its hold-
ing by exempting from the exclusionary rule statements made to un-
trained police or statements elicited without the use of psychological
pressures. It would appear to follow that the Court, in prescribing
the blanket assistance of counsel rules, was concerned with the
possibility of unfairness rather than with the degree of abuse in a
particular case. It is submitted that the possibility for abusing the
rights of the grand jury witness is similarly great and should dictate
the same result.
The Court made it clear in Miranda that in addition to pro-
1 5 The Court noted that in effectively protecting the right of silence, the presence
of counsel would also "insure that statements made in the government-established
atmosphere are not the product of compulsion." Id. at 466.
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viding counsel to fortify the fifth amendment privilege, the sixth
amendment guarantee of counsel is involved in a custodial interroga-
tion. Where, as in Escobedo, the defendant is denied access to his
lawyer during the questioning, his sixth amendment rights are
abridged. 15 6  It is further evident from the facts of Escobedo that
the right to counsel may arise at a point in time before indictment.1 7
Moreover, where the right to counsel has already attached in the
police station after the "criminal prosecution" commences, the un-
answered question is whether the right to counsel and the criminal
prosecution temporarily cease while the future defendant is com-
pelled t6 appear before the grand jury to answer under oath the
questions of the prosecutor. None of the policy factors supporting
the rule excluding a witness' counsel from grand jury proceedings
would seem so strong as to dictate the creation of such a gap.",,
CONCLUSION
For the grand jury witness to maximize his self-interest during a
compulsory appearance may be a difficult task. Where the witness
apprehends danger in the probings of the grand jury, he must often
rely on the privilege against self-incrimination, which is subject to
waiver 59 as well as loss through a grant of immunity.1 60 The witness
may also adversely affect his own future criminal defense by supply-
ing evidence which can be used for impeaching his testimony at
trial.'6 ' In addition, the witness may be unaware that informa-
tion he is asked to give is protected by an applicable statutory
150 Id. at 465 n.35.
157 See Greenwell v. United States, 336 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
923 (1964). See also White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam) (at arraign-
ment).
This "point in time" factor appeared crucial to Mr. Justice Stewart in dissent:
"Under our system of criminal justice the instigation of formal, meaningful judicial
proceedings, by way of indictment, information, or arraignment, marks the point at
which criminal investigation commenced." 378 U.S. at 493-94.
158 In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Court held that incrim-
inating information acquired by means of electronic eavesdropping after defendant
had been indicted and while he was awaiting trial was procured in violation of the
right to counsel. The opinion seems to proceed on the theory that once the right of
counsel has accrued, it inheres until after trial.
Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966). "Thus, the need for counsel to
protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to consult with
counsel prior to questioning... if the defendant so desires."
189 See notes 74-78 supra and accompanying text.
1.o See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
"I" See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
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privilege. 62  Furthermore, the witness who is also an object of the
investigation must keep in mind the effect his conduct may have
in his endeavor to avoid being indicted. Finally, the grand jury
witness must be fully cognizant of the law of contempt 163 and warned
against perjuring himself to conceal incriminating information. 164
For the uninformed layman, the full enjoyment of these rights may
be quite difficult to obtain and efforts to exercise them may lead to
serious sanctions.
To fortify the existing rights of grand jury witnesses in keeping
with recent developments expanding the criminal defendant's consti-
tutional rights, various courses are now open to the courts:
(1) The rule, based on the privilege against self-incrimination,
immunizing prospective defendants from grand jury appearances may
be more generally adopted.6 5 This rule, however, may not provide
the best solution to the problem. Besides preventing the prospective
defendant from testifying in a way so as to nip his accusation and
possible prosecution in the bud,'66 it is not broad enough in its im-
munization. Under this rule de jure and sometimes de facto de-
fendants are immunized from appearance; however, a suspicion of
the witness' criminality may first occur during the questioning, as
in the case of a merely potential defendant. 67 When this occurs,
162 See notes 101-07 supra and accompanying text.
263 See notes 87-95 supra and accompanying text.
10, See, e.g., United States v. Rosen, 353 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 908 (1966); United States v. Collins, 272 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
362 U.S. 911 (1960); United States v. Parker, 244 F.2d 943, (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 836 (1957).
1r5 See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
108 New York permits the prospective defendant to appear under certain circum-
stances but requires a waiver of immunity in exchange. Furthermore, under the New
York rule, the accused must learn of the pending investigation on his own to take
advantage of the appearance option. See note 19 supra.
Allowing the prospective defendant to appear in order to exonerate himself at an
early date-thereby avoiding the expense and stigma of a full-fledged prosecution-
would also comport with the primary purpose of the grand jury. See notes 16-17
supra and acccompanying text.
1- see note 99 supra. Grand juries, with their broad subpoena power, are most
effective in conducting investigations into suspected widespread criminal activities
(e.g., antitrust violations, corruption in government) rather than isolated and indi-
vidual criminal acts, and it is precisely in these instances where the ultimate de-
fendants are usually unknown at the outset. See, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 354
F.2d 931, 932-33 (2d Cir. 1966) (investigation of alleged "bribery, graft and other cor-
ruption involving postal employees and mail contractors in the New York region');
United States v. Rosen, 553 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966)
(involving investigation into bribery, graft, extortion, and other corrupt practices
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further interrogation may introduce the spectres which the rule is
designed to avoid.
(2) The, evidence given by a witness before a grand jury may
be excluded from governmental use against him where it is deter-
mined that-under the circumstances he was entitled to the assistance
of counsel but such assistance was denied.1 8  Although this rule
would have the advantage of allowing the accused to clear himself
at the onset of criminal involvement by personal appearance, its
effectuation would involve many difficult elements of proof. First,
the witness might have to show that the investigation had shifted
from the "inquisitorial" to the "accusatorial" stage sometime before
the harmful testimony was given." 9 Second, and more importantly,
he might have to demonstrate that the prosecution used the particu-
lar evidence obtained during the grand jury proceeding to procure
other evidence against him, as opposed to the possibility that the
secondary evidence was obtained, from an independent source or
different lead. 70
(3) A witness, called to appear before a grand jury, may be
afforded the right to assistance from counsel during his interroga-
tion.17 Adoption of this rule would have the distinct advantages of
completely satisfying the guarantees of the fifth and sixth amendments
while at the same time providing easy administration.
The effect which the extension of the right to counsel might have
on the institution of the grand jury as an effective instrument of the
criminal law, although difficult to ascertain in advance, would upon
reflection appear to be negligible. It has already been noted that
extension of this right would neither adversely affect the secret
allegedly involving FHA employees and local builders); United States v. Winter,
348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965) (same). During the course of
such investigations it may be essential for the grand jury to call persons whose criminal
responsibility is impossible to determine beforehand hut who will eventually be charged.
See Enker & Elsen, supra note 120, at 74.
108 See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text.
169 See text accompanying note 153 supra; Enker & Elsen, supra note 120, at 73.
In the event, however, that a grand jury interrogation is considered necessarily to
constitute a "custodial interrogation" under Miranda, no showing of "accusatorial"
propensity would appear to be necessary. See text accompanying note 155 supra.
270 The right to have information or its fruits which are procured by the violation
of constitutional rights excluded from evidence and from governmental consideration
should be thought of exclusively as a remedial right. Where the practice which consti-
tuted the abridgment of the constitutional rights in question may be avoided altogther,
such an alternative ought to be adopted. Suppression of illegal evidence is a poor sub-
stitute for the prohibition of its procurement.
171 See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
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nature of the proceedings172 nor result in undesirable delays.173 The
only valid objection remaining is that the presence of counsel would
interfere with the investigatory freedom of the grand jury or the
prosecutor and thereby impede justice. 74 This argument cuts both
ways. To the extent that the free hand of the prosecutor is preserved,
it must also be recognized that the witness may be the calculated
target of its excesses. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, there is
little reason to believe that the legitimate investigatory activities of
the grand jury would be at all impaired by the extension of the right
to counsel for the benefit of the witnesses.
72 See note 120 supra and accompanying text.
178 See note 119 supra and accompanying text.
17' See note 121 supra and accompanying text.
